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Abstract
Unprecedented quantities of personal and business data are collected, stored,
shared, and processed by countless institutions all over the world. Promi-
nent examples include sharing personal data on social networking sites, storing
credit card details in every store, tracking customer preferences of supermarket
chains, and storing key personal data on biometric passports.
Confidentiality issues naturally arise from this global data growth. There
are continously reports about how private data is leaked from confidential
sources where the implications of the leaks range from embarrassment to seri-
ous personal privacy and business damages.
This dissertation addresses the problem of automatically quantifying the
amount of leaked information in programs. It presents multiple program anal-
ysis techniques of different degrees of automation and scalability.
The contributions of this thesis are two fold: a theoretical result and two
different methods for inferring and checking quantitative information flows are
presented.
The theoretical result relates the amount of possible leakage under any
probability distribution back to the order relation in Landauer and Redmond’s
lattice of partitions [35]. The practical results are split in two analyses: a first
analysis precisely infers the information leakage using SAT solving and model
counting; a second analysis defines quantitative policies which are reduced to
checking a k-safety problem. A novel feature allows reasoning independent of
the secret space.
The presented tools are applied to real, existing leakage vulnerabilities in
operating system code. This has to be understood and weighted within the
context of the information flow literature which suffers under an apparent lack
of practical examples and applications. This thesis studies such “real leaks”
which could influence future strategies for finding information leaks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Unprecedented quantities of personal and business data are collected, stored,
shared, and processed by countless institutions all over the world. Promi-
nent examples are sharing personal data on social networking sites, storing
credit card details in every store, tracking customer preferences of supermar-
ket chains, and storing key personal data on biometric passports.
Data breaches – malicious or unintentional release of confidential infor-
mation – naturally arise from this global data growth. There are multiple
institutions in the US alone which track and research these breaches. For
example, Verizon released the “2010 Data Breach Investigations Report” in
collaboration with the US Secret Service which studies and categorises a se-
lection of over 900 breaches and in excess of 900 million leaked data records in
the last six years. The most affected sectors are the Financial Services (33%)
followed by Hospitality (23%); however all industrial sectors are affected.
This global problem asks for solutions. Verizon’s report mentions, amongst
others, the following mitigation efforts: (1) ensure essential controls are met (2)
eliminate unnecessary data and keep tabs on what is left (3) test and review
web applications. How this is achieved in practice is however an unsolved
challenge.
One strategy to prevent or at least contain such data breaches is to check
the software which handles confidential information for leaks. The upcoming
research area of quantitative information flow tries to achieve exactly that.
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1.1 THESIS OUTLINE AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Ultimately, the goal is that quantifying information leakage is part of the
software development cycle and appears as simple as type checking programs.
However, the research is not yet there.
This dissertation addresses the question on how to automatically quantify
the amount of leaked information in programs. It presents multiple program
analysis techniques and implementations of different degrees of automation
and scalability.
The chapters tell the story of increasingly more useful and applied analyses.
It starts off with the foundational theory behind the works; the following chap-
ters each describe an analysis which is motivated by the previous chapter. It
finishes with an elegant and surprisingly simple algorithm to check information
leakage policies in much more complex code than previously achieved.
1.1 Thesis outline and contributions
Chapter 2 covers preliminary technical details and motivates assumptions
made throughout the thesis.
Chapter 3 describes the algebraic basis of quantitative information flow
analysis. We show how random variables and programs can be represented as
partitions. These partitions are shown to be useful building blocks to capture
how programs leak confidential information and the subsequent chapters al-
ways compute the partition representation of programs. The chapter contains
a fundamental result between the order of partitions and the possible leakage
under any distribution.
Chapter 4 describes a first analysis which runs on a simple while language.
It computes the leakage by complete enumeration of the whole confidential
variable range. It implements the loop leakage formula of [38] and presents a
safe upper bound for the leakage. Also, its inefficiency motivates more refined
analyses.
Chapter 5 describes algorithms and an implementation which automat-
ically and statically quantifies the exact leakage for a subset of ANSI C pro-
grams. The algorithms are based on SAT solving and model counting and
implement a reachability analysis.
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The chapter provides a small benchmark which demonstrates its perfor-
mance and scalability for difficult and known instances of the relevant litera-
ture. Also, we describe an application of the tool which measures leakage in
aggregated database queries. This unconventional application to an outside
field merely shows a possible, different use of quantifying information leaks.
Chapter 6 describes a method which does not precisely compute leakage
anymore. The idea is to bound leakage and ask instead the question whether
a program satisfies or violates a given leakage bound. This is an instance
of checking information leakage instead of inferring it which proves to be a
more feasible approach. One novelty of this approach is that the analysis is
independent of the confidential variable size. This allows the analysis to run
on much more complex data types. A driver formulates the leakage policy and
a model checker checks for violation.
The applications in this chapter are reported leakage vulnerabilities in the
Linux Kernel and different authentication routines. Device drivers with known
leakage vulnerabilities are checked for different leakage policies. Additionally,
the officially applied patches are proved to reduce the information leakage.
Chapter 7 describes other existing tools and techniques of authors who
work on quantifying leakage. It also lists all relevant techniques used within
this thesis and refers to their original publications.
This research is sponsored by the EPSRC grant EP/F023766/1 with the ti-
tle “Model Checking and Program Analysis for Quantifying Interference”. The
main focus of the grant is the development of tools for quantifying interference.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter introduces basic notation and theory used throughout the thesis.
It also serves to define the implicit computational and model assumptions made
in the rest of the document.
2.1 While language syntax and semantics
Throughout this work, concepts and analyses are explained in terms of the
following while-language unless mentioned otherwise. The syntax and denota-
tional semantics of commands of the language are shown in tables 2.1 and 2.2.
C := skip | x = E | C; C | if B C C | while B C
E := x | n | E + E | E − E | E ∗ E
B := ¬B | B ∧B | B ∨B | E < E | E == E
C ∈ Cmd, E ∈ Exp, B ∈ BExp, x ∈ Var, n ∈ N
Table 2.1: Syntax of While language
Members of the set of states Σ are denoted σ : Var → N, with Var being
the set of variable identifiers. Arithmetic expressions are interpreted as the
map [[E]] : Σ→ N and boolean expressions have the interpretation [[B]] : Σ→
10
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[[skip]] = λσ.σ
[[x = E]] = λσ.σ[[[E]]σ/x]
[[C1;C2]] = [[C2]] ◦ [[C1]] = λσ.[[C2]]([[C1]]σ)
[[if B C1 C2]] = λσ.
{
[[C1]]σ, if[[B]]σ = 1
[[C2]]σ, if[[B]]σ = 0
[[while B C]] = lfp F where F (f) = λσ.
{
(f ◦ [[C]])σ, if[[B]]σ = 1
σ, if[[B]]σ = 0
Table 2.2: Denotational Semantics of While language
{0, 1}. A command C is a state transformer map [[C]] : Σ→ Σ with the usual
interpretation of least fix point of a function F for loops [64]. We further
assume that in general commands are terminating, but in some contexts non-
termination can be included as observable state.
A program P is a sequence of commands using sequential composition.
For an initial store σ, [[P ]]σ computes the final variable store. As we only
consider input/output semantics, [[P ]] can be seen as set of all executions [[P ]] =
{(σ, [[P ]]σ), (σ′, [[P ]]σ′), . . . } where every element of the set is a single execution
(input/output tuple). A subset T ⊆ [[P ]] is a selection of executions.
2.2 Information flow and noninterference
This section introduces concepts from the secure information flow literature
used in this thesis. Denning introduced a lattice model of information flow
where variables are partitioned into security labels [23]. The confidential vari-
ables have a “high” security label H and the public variables have a “low”
security label L. All low variables are publicly observable while the high vari-
ables contain confidential information and are kept secret. A partial order
describes the allowed flows in a system, where L ≤ H allows flows up the
lattice and disallows flows from H to the lower label L.
Goguen and Meseguer describe, in a general automaton framework, the
idea of noninterference as a requirement for checking if a certain security pol-
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icy holds [26]. Their definition works on groups of users where, given nonin-
terference, each group can not see the effect of commands used by any other
group.
Volpano, Smith, and Irvine described the lattice model of information flow
and noninterference in a language-based setting [63]. The authors proved the
soundness of Denning’s analysis using a type system which coincides with the
idea of noninterference.
Definition 1 (Noninterference). For any two states σ1 and σ2 which agree
on the values of all low variables v ∈ L, σ1(v) = σ2(v), also satisfy the same
equality after the execution of a terminating program P :
(P (σ1))(v) = (P (σ2))(v)
This definition is checked syntactically using type system rules where the
security labels are part of the type.
From an automation viewpoint a more useful and precise way of checking
secure information flows in a program is the semantic approach by Leino and
Joshi [36]:
Definition 2 (Secure information flow – Leino-Joshi). With the assignment
of an arbitrary value to all high variables denoted by HH, a program P is
noninterfering if the following equation is satisfied:
HH;P ;HH = P ;HH
Here the fragmentHH;P describes a program running on an arbitrary high
value, where P ;HH indicates that after the program is run all high values are
“forgotten”. The equality of the two, as in the equation above, together with
a ;HH on both sides indicates that only low variables are known after the
execution and that the execution does not depend on the starting value of the
high variables.
This semantic approach has multiple benefits especially with our quantita-
tive goals in mind: it is less conservative than a type system approach. A type
system will have to reject any program which contains a sub program which
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on its own is noninterfering. It can be applied to any language construct with
definable semantics, including nondeterminism and it is more useful in the
context of automated verification than a type-based approach.
Leino and Joshi’s definition will be used in later chapters to motivate a
verification approach to quantifying information leaks.
2.3 Information theory
This section contains a very short review of some basic definitions of Infor-
mation Theory; additional background is readily available in the standard
textbook by Cover and Thomas [19].
Definition 3 (Entropy). Given a space of events X = (xi)i∈N with the prob-
ability mass function p(xi) for event xi, Shannon’s entropy is defined as
H(X) , −
∑
xi∈X
p(xi) log p(xi) (2.1)
Informally, the entropy measures the average information content of the
set of events: in the extreme case of an event with probability 1 the entropy
will be 0 and on the other hand, if the distribution is uniform with every
event equally likely then the entropy is maximal, i.e. log |N |. In the literature
the terms information content and uncertainty in this context are often used
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the number of possible distinctions on
the set of events.
The cardinality of the space of events is important in this work, thus we
are going to prove the information theoretical result when entropy attains its
maximal value.
H(X) ≤ log |N | (2.2)
Proof. Jensen’s Inequality is used for the proof which states that for any convex
function f and random variable X the following holds
E[f(X)] ≥ f(E[X])
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with E[·] being the expected value of random variableX. For a discrete random
variable with probability mass function p(xi) this is
∑
X xi p(xi).
Shannon entropy itself can also be seen as such an expectation, or mean
value, of a function f(u) where f = log2 and u =
1
p(x)
. As entropy is concave
we invert Jensen’s inequality and get
H(X) = E[log2(
1
p(x)
)] ≤ log2(E[
1
p(x)
])
then by noticing that E[ 1
p(x)
] =
∑
N p(x)
1
p(x)
= |N | we arrive at
H(X) ≤ log2 |N |
where the equality holds only when 1
p(x)
is constant, thus enforcing uniform
distribution.
Definition 4 (Joint Entropy). Given two random variables X and Y , the
joint entropy H(X, Y ) measures the uncertainty of the joint random variable
(X, Y ). It is defined as
H(X, Y ) , −
∑
x∈X,y∈Y
p(X = x, Y = y) log p(X = x, Y = y)
where p(X = x, Y = y) is the joint probability mass function defined as
p(X = x|Y = Y ) p(Y = y)
Definition 5 (Conditional Entropy). Conditional entropy H(X|Y ) measures
the uncertainty about X given the knowledge of Y . It is defined in terms of
the chain rule
H(X|Y ) , H(X, Y )−H(Y )
The higher H(X|Y ) is, the lower is the correlation between X and Y .
It is easy to see that if X is a function of Y , then H(X|Y ) = 0 (there is
no uncertainty on X knowing Y if X is a function of Y ) and if X and Y
are independent then H(X|Y ) = H(X) (knowledge of Y does not change the
uncertainty on X if they are independent) .
14
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Definition 6 (Mutual Information). Mutual information I(X;Y ) is a measure
of how much information random variables X and Y share. It is defined in
terms of conditional entropy
I(X;Y ) , H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X)
Thus the information shared between X and Y is the information of X (re-
spectively, Y ) from which the information about X given Y has been deduced.
This quantity measures the relationship between X and Y . For example X
and Y are independent iff I(X;Y ) = 0.
Mutual information is a measure of binary interaction. Conditional mutual
information, a form of ternary interaction will be used to quantify leakage.
Definition 7 (Conditional Mutual Information). Conditional mutual infor-
mation measures the relationship between two random variables X and Y con-
ditioned on a third random variable Y . It is defined as
I(X;Y |Z) , H(X|Z)−H(X|Y, Z) = H(Y |Z)−H(Y |X,Z)
where H(Y |X,Z) is read as H(Y |(X,Z)).
A further important quantity based on mutual information is the channel
capacity.
Definition 8 (Channel Capacity). Given two random variables H and O which
represent the input and output of a system respectively, the channel capacity is
defined as the maximal mutual information between H and O. It is defined as
max
µ
Iµ(O;H)
where µ is the distribution on the input which maximises the mutual informa-
tion.
For a single random variable O, CC(O) denotes the channel capacity of O
as follows
CC(O) , max
µ
Hµ(O)
15
2.5 PARTITION AND EQUIVALENCE RELATIONS
Here, µ is the distribution on the inputs of O which make the outputs of O
most uniform, as a result of equation 2.2.
2.4 Partition and equivalence relations
Partitions are heavily used to represent fundamental structures in this thesis
and the terms partition and equivalence relation are used interchangeably from
now on.
A partition Π of a set S is a family of subsets of S such that the following
conditions are satisfied
• Every block in Π is nonempty
• Every element in S is contained in exactly one block of Π
where a block of Π is simply an element of Π.
Given the set S = {a, b, c, d} then the following is an example partition of
that set
Π = {{a}{b, c}{d}}.
An equivalence relation on a set S satisfies a reflexive, symmetric, and
transitive relation on S. For example, the function λn. mod n describes an
equivalence relation ∼ mod n on a set of integers S for any integer n. Taking
S = {1, 2, 3, 4} and n = 2 then
∼ mod 2= {{1, 3}{2, 4}}
where 1 ∼ mod 2 3 denote that the two integers are seen as equivalent or related
under the given relation. Also, an equivalence class of s ∈ S with respect to
an equivalence relation ∼ is defined as [s]∼ = {s′ ∈ S|s′ ∼ s}. Thus, an
equivalence relation determines a partition of a given set where each block of
the partition is described by an equivalence class of the equivalence relation.
Equally, a partition Π of a set S determines a specific equivalence relation
on that set. This equivalence relation is described for every s, s′ ∈ S. s ∼ s′ if
and only if s and s′ are in the same block in partition Π.
16
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2.5 Estimating a multinomial distribution
Probability distributions are not a focus of the work presented in this thesis.
Uniform distribution is mostly used to assign probabilities to outcomes and
it is often just assumed that xi
n
is the “right” estimate for the probability of
an observed event, where xi is the number of occurrences of event i and n the
total number of observations.
Usually, an event is that a program evaluates to value o with input h, where
for example if 10 out of 100 tested inputs lead to value o then the probability
of that event is assumed to be 10
100
. The following derivation shows that this is
a reasonable estimate.
The multinomial distribution is suitable to model the probabilities of k
equivalence classes by their cardinality. We assume to have k possible out-
comes, the random variables Xi = xi describe the number of times outcome i
was observed over n trials. The probabilities are described by p1, . . . , pk, where
pi = P (Xi = xi). The probability mass function is
f(x1, . . . , xk;n, p1, . . . , pk) = P (X1 = x1, . . . , Xk = xk) =
n!
x1! · · ·xk!p
x1
1 · · · pxkk
with
∑k
i=1 xi = n.
We assume the data is given, in other words we have observed the vector
x = (xi, . . . , xk). The task now is to assign the most likely probabilities to these
counts. This can be shown using a maximum likelihood estimate, by starting
with the log likelihood, where l(p1, . . . , pk) = f(x1, . . . , xk;n, p1, . . . , pk):
L = log l(p1, . . . , pk, λ) = log n!−
∑
k
log xi! +
∑
k
xi log pi + λ(1−
∑
k
pi)
which is simply the logarithm of the probability mass function and an addi-
tional lagrange multiplier encoding the constraint of a probability distribution.
This likelihood has to be maximised by setting all derivatives over all argu-
ments to 0. This is simplified greatly because the first two summands are
17
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constant and results in:
dL
dpi
=
xi
pi
− λ = 0
dL
dλ
= 1−
∑
k
pi = 0
To find the value of λ we multiply the first derivative by pi and plug in the
sum over k: ∑
k
xi − λ
∑
k
pi = 0
=
∑
k
xi − λ 1 = 0
=n = λ
Thus, we can substitute the newly found λ in the first derivative and arrive at
the maximum likelihood estimate
pi =
xi
n
(2.3)
This estimator of equivalence class probabilities can be shown to be unbi-
ased and consistent; unbiased because its expectation is the true probability
and consistent because the more data points there are the better the estimate.
2.6 Summary of model assumptions
Unless specified otherwise the following assumptions hold throughout the doc-
ument: all languages are deterministic; all programs terminate; semantics con-
sider input/output states only; all random variables follow uniform distribu-
tion; logarithms are base 2.
Table 2.1 summarises the notation and symbols used in this thesis.
18
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E[·] Expected value
H(·), H(·|·) (Conditional) Shannon entropy
I(· ; ·), I(· ; ·|·) (Conditional) Mutual information
X, Y,O,H, L Random variables
h, l, o Program variables
[[C]] Input-output semantics of command C
Σ Set of all states/atoms in the lattice
σi, σ
′ Members of Σ
{{a, b} · · · } Partition with block containing states a, b
∼,',≈ Equivalence relations
I(Σ) Set of all partitions
>,⊥ Top and bottom element in the lattice
unionsq,u Lattice join and meet
v Partial order on partitions
Figure 2.1: Notation
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Chapter 3
Lattice of Information
This chapter describes information leakage in programs using information the-
ory. It introduces and motivates the use of partitions as a central element in
the computation of leakage and recasts existing work [38] in terms of partitions.
The content has been published in the proceedings of Formal Methods
for Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages (SFM 2010) in LNCS
[41]. Previous research on the same content has been presented at the Work-
shop Quantitative Analysis of Software (QA 2009) which had proceedings in
a Berkeley Technical Report [28], and has been presented at the Workshop on
Programming Language Interference and Dependence (PLID 2009).
For the syntax and semantics of language code used in this chapter, please
refer to section 2.1.
3.1 Quantifying interference
This section describes the work by Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [13] as a brief
introduction to quantifying interference using information theory, or what will
also be called leakage.
The starting point is the usual assumption that program variables are par-
titioned into two sets, H “high” and L “low”. High variables contain confi-
dential or secret information which are never directly visible to an attacker.
Low variables on the other hand are publicly observable at any point during
20
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the execution, depending on the power of an attacker. Leakage is the amount
of information one can learn about H by observing L.
The leakage quantity is measured using information theory. This chapter
describes the connection between information theoretical measures of leakage
and programs.
The most central element of information theory are random variables. In
our setting, a random variable is a map X : D → R, where D and R are finite
sets and D has a probability distribution µ associated with it. We let x range
over the values which X can take on, and similarly elements in the sample
space D are denoted d.
The probability that X takes on value x, written p(x), is simply the sum
of the probabilities in X’s preimage
p(x)
def
=
∑
d∈X−1(x)
µ(d)
Next, as entropy is a function of p(x)
H(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log2 p(x)
it follows that the preimage of X completely defines its entropy. Or again
in other words, the random variable X partitions its sample space D into
blocks which are indistinguishable to an observer who only sees X = x. This
partitioning is formalised by the kernel of a function f : A → B which is the
equivalence relation 'f where
a1 'f a2 ⇐⇒ f(a1) = f(a2). (3.1)
Thus, if two random variables have the same kernel they are said to be obser-
vationally equivalent and they also agree on their entropy.
We are going to adopt the deterministic model of information flow from
[13]. This model describes the information flow from a joint input 〈High,Low〉
(where for readability the random variables are written as words instead of
capital letters) to the output random variable O = f(〈High,Low〉) where f
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is a deterministic function representing a program. The information flow, or
leakage from High to O is shown to be the conditional entropy of O given Low
FLow(High O) = H(O|Low)
This is the case in systems defined by simple imperative programs without
nondeterministic language constructs.
3.1.1 Computing entropy and leakage
Ultimately, we are interested in computing the entropy H(O|Low) which quan-
tifies the leakage in a program. One key aspect of the entropy calculation is
that there is a qualitative and quantitative part. The qualitative part is the
equivalence relation derived from the random variable O|Low, the quantitative
part is computing p(o|l) for all o ∈ O, l ∈ Low. These two parts however can
be separated. First the equivalence relation can be computed, then given µ,
the quantification can take place. This is the overarching strategy in this work
and we mainly focus on computing the qualitative part while always keeping
enough quantitative properties of O|Low intact.
This chapter describes the general structure of such equivalence relations
in more detail and connects them with observations and programs.
3.2 Lattice of information and leakage
3.2.1 Observations and indistinguishability
The concept of an observation is a key element in our model. The leakage
quantity can essentially be seen as the result of a backwards reasoning process
of an attacker, from the outputs – or observations – of a program to the high
values at the input of the program.
Given a specific observable O = o an attacker who would like to find the
high part of this computation is left with no choice but to assume that it was
one of the elements in the preimage O−1(o). The set of high values in the
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preimage are in the context of equation 3.1 indistinguishable from each other.
Thus, one observable describes an equivalence class of high values.
Naturally, one can always define a least informative observation (no obser-
vations can be made) and a most informative observation (every element is
distinguishable). An equivalence class is then the set of high values that are
indistinguishable by the corresponding observation.
3.2.2 Order relation of equivalence relations
Given a system with a set of possible states Σ, the set of all possible partitions
over Σ is a complete lattice: the Lattice of Information (LoI) [35]. The order
on partitions is given by refinement: a partition is “above” another if it is more
informative, i.e. each block in the lower partition is larger or equal to a block
in the partition above.
An alternative view of the same structure is in terms of equivalence re-
lations. There is a simple translation between an equivalence relation and
a partition: an equivalence relation defines the partition whose blocks are
equivalences classes. The terms equivalence relation and partition are used
synonymously.
Let us define the set I(Σ) which stands for the set of all possible equivalence
relations on a set Σ. The ordering of I(Σ) is now defined as
≈ v ∼ ↔ ∀σ1, σ2 (σ1 ∼ σ2 ⇒ σ1 ≈ σ2) (3.2)
where ≈,∼ ∈ I(Σ) and σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ. Furthermore, the join unionsq and meet u lattice
operations are the intersection of relations and the transitive closure union of
relations, respectively. Thus, higher elements in the lattice can distinguish
more while lower elements in the lattice can distinguish less states. It easily
follows from (3.2) that I(Σ) is a complete lattice.
We assume this lattice to be finite; this is motivated by the finite bit width
of program variables: a k bit variable has 2k possible values. This assumption
can be generalised to an infinite lattice which is however not considered in this
work.
A typical example of how these equivalence relations can be used in an
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information flow setting is the following [68]. Let us assume the set of states
Σ consists of a tuple 〈h, l〉 where l is a low variable and h is a confidential high
variable. One possible program can be described by the equivalence relation
〈h1, l1〉 ≈ 〈h2, l2〉 ↔ l1 = l2
That is the observer can only distinguish states which agree on the low variable
part. Clearly, a more revealing program is one which distinguishes any two
states from one another, or
〈h1, l1〉 ∼ 〈h2, l2〉 ↔ l1 = l2 ∧ h1 = h2
The ∼-program reveals more information than the ≈-program by comparing
states, therefore ≈ v ∼.
3.2.3 Measures on the lattice of information
Let us attempt to quantify the amount of information provided by a point in
the lattice of information.
One possibility is to take the cardinality of a partition P as its measure,
which results in block counting: |P | = “number of blocks in P”. This measure
is 1 for the least informative partition and its maximal value is reached by
the top partition. This choice of measure reflects the lattice order because if
A v B then |A| ≤ |B|. However, the important property of “additivity” for
measures, the inclusion-exclusion principle, is not satisfied. In terms of sets,
the inclusion-exclusion principle states that the number of elements in a union
of sets is the sum of the number of elements of the two sets minus the number of
elements in the intersection1. In this example, the inclusion-exclusion principle
is expressed as
|A unionsqB| = |A|+ |B| − |A uB|
1The principle is universal e.g. in propositional logic the truth value of A∨B is given by
the truth value of A plus the truth value of B minus the truth value of A ∧B.
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To demonstrate the contradiction, let us take the following two partitions
A = {{1, 2}{3, 4}}, B = {{1, 3}{2, 4}}
then their join and meet will be
A unionsqB = {{1}{2}{3}{4}}, A uB = {{1, 3, 2, 4}}.
The counting principle from above is in this case not satisfied
|A unionsqB| = 4 6= 3 = |A|+ |B| − |A uB|
Another problem with the cardinality | · | is that when I(Σ) is considered as
a lattice of random variables the measure may end up being too coarse, as it
discards all probabilities. To address this problem we introduce more abstract
lattice theoretic notions.
A valuation on I(Σ) is a real valued map ν : I(Σ) → R which satisfies the
following properties:
ν(X unionsq Y ) = ν(X) + ν(Y )− ν(X u Y ) (3.3)
X v Y implies ν(X) ≤ ν(Y ) (3.4)
A join semivaluation is a weak valuation, i.e. a real valued map where property
3.3 is relaxed to an inequality
ν(X unionsq Y ) ≤ ν(X) + ν(Y )− ν(X u Y ) (3.5)
for every element X and Y in a lattice [51]. The property 3.4 is order-
preserving: a higher element in the lattice has a larger valuation than elements
below itself. The property 3.5 is a weakened inclusion-exclusion principle.
Proposition 1. The map
ν(X unionsq Y ) , H(X, Y ) (3.6)
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is a join semivaluation on I(Σ) .
Proof. The tricky part is to prove that inequality 3.5 is satisfied. Since it is
true that
H(X, Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )− I(X;Y )
it will be enough to prove that
H(X u Y ) ≤ I(X;Y )
This can be proved by noticing the following two facts
1. H(X u Y ) = I(X u Y ;X) this is clear because I(X u Y ;X) measures
the information shared between X u Y and X and because X u Y v X
such measure has to be H(X u Y )
2. I(X u Y ;X) ≤ I(Y ;X) this is clear because X u Y v Y hence there is
more information shareable between Y and X than between X u Y and
X
Putting those two items together, it follows that
H(X u Y ) = I(X u Y ;X) ≤ I(Y ;X).
An important result proved by Nakamura [51] gives a particular impor-
tance to Shannon entropy as a measure on I(Σ) . He proved that the only
probability-based join semivaluation on the lattice of information is Shannon’s
entropy. It is easy to show that a valuation itself is not definable on this lat-
tice, thus Shannon’s entropy is the best approximation to a probability-based
valuation on this lattice.
Other measures can be used, which are however less mathematically ap-
pealing. Min-Entropy, used recently by Smith in an information flow context
[57], could be considered as it seems like a good, complementing measure.
While Shannon entropy intuitively results in an “averaging” measure over a
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probability distribution, the Min-Entropy H∞ takes on a “worst-case” view:
only the maximal value p(x) of a random variable X is considered
H∞(X) = − logmax
x∈X
p(x)
where it is always the case that H∞(X) ≤ H(X).
Another useful tool when working with partitions is considering condition-
ing of two partitions X and Y . The conditional partition Y |X = x (where x
is a block in X) is the intersection of all blocks in Y with x; given Y |X = x
a probability distribution is achieved by normalising the probabilities, with
normalisation factor p(x).
The notation Y |X = x is justified because H(Y |X = x) is the usual notion
of information theoretical entropy of the variable Y given the event X = x.
Formally,
Y |X = x ≡ {y ∩ x|y ∈ Y } (3.7)
and the probability distribution associated to Y |X = x is
{p(y ∩ x)
p(x)
|y ∈ Y }. (3.8)
3.3 Relating lattice order and entropy
The choice of using partitions as basic building block for the quantification of
leakage and to only assume uniform distribution may seem overly restrictive or
not expressive enough. The following two results however justify that decision.
The first states that the order relation imposes bounds on the possible entropy
of a random variable for any distribution. The second one restates the first
under the worst case distribution, the channel capacity.
Theorem 1.
X v Y ⇐⇒ ∀µ.Hµ(X) ≤ Hµ(Y )
Proof.
=⇒ direction follows from entropy being a semi valuation.
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⇐= direction by contraposition. We want to prove that
X 6v Y =⇒ ∃µ.Hµ(X) 6≤ Hµ(Y )
by taking two partitions where a block of Y is refined in X
Y = {{1, 2}{3, 4}{5}{6}}
X = {{1, 2}{3}{4}{5}{6}}
where it is clear that X 6v Y . Next, as choice of µ we assign zero probability
to all elements of the input space with the exception of the refining elements
3 and 4 which receive probabilities 0.1 and 0.9 respectively. Thus it is easy to
confirm that
−(0.1 + 0.9) log2(0.1 + 0.9) < −0.1 log2(0.1)− 0.9 log2(0.9)
H(Y ) < H(X)
In general, when blocksX1, . . . , Xi refine block Y1 then choosing the probability
distribution µ(Y1) = 1 leads to H(Y ) = 0 < H(X).
Here, CC(X) is the channel capacity of X as defined in section 2.3. The
channel capacity is achieved by the distribution which makes the probability
of equivalence classes uniform2.
Proposition 2.
X v Y =⇒ CC(X) ≤ CC(Y )
Proof. Y refines X, thus Y has equal or more equivalence classes than X. Its
larger cardinality implies larger channel capacity because channel capacity is
log2 of the cardinality (see equation 2.2 in chapter 2).
2not to be confused with uniform input distribution
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3.4 Measuring leakage of programs
3.4.1 Transition system and observations over programs
The previous sections defined the lattice and lattice order in terms of arbitrary
states Σ. To model programs we assume states to be part of a transition system
(Σ, I, F, T ) where
1. Σ is the set of states,
2. I is the set of initial states (I ⊆ Σ),
3. F is the set of final states,
4. T ⊆ Σ× Σ is a the transition relation.
Let us define a successor function for a state σ ∈ Σ
Post(σ) = {σ′ ∈ Σ | (σ, σ′) ∈ T}
A state σ is in F if Post(σ) = ∅. A path is a finite sequence of states
pi = σ0σ1σ2 . . . σn such that σ0 ∈ I and σn ∈ F . Also, a state is a tuple
σ = σH × σL of the pair of confidential input H and low input L. The input-
output semantic valuation mapping [[P ]] : Σ→ Σ evaluates P for a given initial
state and outputs its final state.
Now, an observation over a program P is the equivalence relation on high
initial states σH ∈ I induced by [[P ]]. A particular equivalence class will be
called an observable. Hence an observable represents a set of states indistin-
guishable to an attacker making that observation.
A program may or may not have initial low variables whose values are
controlled by an attacker. This control is formalised as the ability to set the
low part of a state before the execution of the program. For the general case,
we assume that the attacker has control over some low variables, where one
particular equivalence relation 'l with value l for the initial low state as follows
∀σ, σ′ ∈ I. σH 'l σ′H ⇐⇒ [[P ]](σ) = [[P ]](σ′) ∧ σL = σ′L = l (3.9)
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Thus the equivalence relation relates the high states which under a particular
low value l result in the same observable output.
We denote this interpretation of a program P in I(Σ) as defined by the
equivalence relation (3.9) by Πl(P ). The relation Πl(P ) is nothing else than
the kernel of the semantics of P .
In the simple case where an attacker can not set the low state, the equiva-
lence relation reduces to
∀σ, σ′ ∈ I. σH ' σ′H ⇐⇒ [[P ]](σ) = [[P ]](σ′) (3.10)
This equivalence relation will be referred to as Π(P ). To ease readability this
equivalence relation is mostly used throughout the chapters unless the attacker
is specifically given the choice to initialise the low initial states.
The distinction between Π(P ) and Πl(P ) is only important if the attacker
has the ability to compare equivalence relations resulting from multiple low
values, or if the attacker has external knowledge that one particular low value
leads to an especially informative equivalence relation.
3.4.2 Definition of measuring leakage
As the lattice framework and program model are now connected, we can de-
velop the notion of leakage. Let us start with the following intuitive statement:
The leakage of confidential information of a program is defined as the dif-
ference between an attacker’s uncertainty about the secret before and after ob-
serving the outputs of the program.
For a Shannon-based measure, the above statement is traditionally [13]
expressed in terms of conditional mutual information. The uncertainty about
the secret by the attacker before observations is H(H|L) and the uncertainty
after observations is H(H|L,Π(P )). Using the definition of conditional mutual
information, leakage is defined as
H(H|L)−H(H|L,Π(P )) = I(H; Π(P )|L)
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We can now simplify the above definition as follows
I(Π(P );H|L) = H(Π(P )|L)−H(Π(P )|L,H)
=A H(Π(P )|L)− 0 = H(Π(P )|L)
=B H(Π(P )) (3.11)
where equality A holds because the program is deterministic and B holds
when the program only depends on the high inputs, for example when all
low variables are initialised in the code of the program. The leakage for such
programs is then defined as
Definition 9 (Leakage). The (Shannon-based) leakage of a program P is de-
fined as the (Shannon) entropy of the partition Π(P ).
Notice that the above definition can easily be adapted to other real valued
maps from the lattice of information, providing possibly different definitions of
leakage: Π(P ) provides a very general representation that can be used as the
basis for several quantitative measures likes Shannon’s entropy, Renyi entropies
or guessability measures.
Definition 10 (Run). A run of a program P is defined to be a single realisation
of equation 3.9 resulting in one equivalence relation Π(P ) or Πl(P ).
Definition 11 (Evaluation). An evaluation of a program P is defined to be
the execution of the program from an initial to a final state, according to its
semantics.
Please note the following distinction which is made in this work: a pro-
gram P , before it is evaluated, always starts with a well-defined initial state,
such that there are no uninitialised variables. This implies that the Shannon-
entropy of a program is always just the entropy of its partition without con-
ditioning on the low variables. This is necessary to distinguish the entropy of
a single-run of the program (the equivalence relation resulting from one fixed
initial state) with the entropy of multiple runs of the program within the same
framework. There are three cases to distinguish:
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• Single-run leakage which is described by Π(P ) or for a particular choice
of l as Πl(P )
• Single-run maximising leakage which can be achieved by a powerful (or
lucky) attacker in one run which results in the maximal equivalence re-
lation (in terms of cardinality) of Πl(P )
• Multi-run leakage where an attacker is able to combine the leakage of
multiple runs by taking the least upper bound of the resulting partitions⊔
LΠl(P ) for some set of low inputs L.
Unless mentioned otherwise, the leakage of a program is the single-run leakage.
As corollary to theorem 1 the order of programs relates to the amount of
leakage by the following result
Corollary 1. Let P1, P2 be two programs depending only on the high inputs.
Then Π(P1) v Π(P2) iff for all probability distributions on states in LoI,
H(Π(P1)) ≤ H(Π(P2)).
The relation between order and leakage is an interesting result because it
underlines how fundamental the order relation in the lattice of information
is to reason about leakage. While the purely qualitative view of partitions is
clearly more coarse than a quantitative view (because it lacks the possibility
of assigning different probability weights to elements in an equivalence class)
it is still fundamentally restricting the amount of leakage that is possible in a
quantitative setting.
This result justifies the measure used in later chapters to bound leakage.
3.4.3 Lattice operations and leakage
The lattice unionsq join operation can be used to combine leakage of different pro-
grams or different runs of the same program, under the assumption of shared
universe of values. First, let us give an example program for Π(P ) and Πl(P ).
Given the program
if (h==0) o=0; else o=1;
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where the variable h ranges over {0, 1, 2, 3}. The equivalence relation Π(P )
associated to the above program is then
Π(P ) = { {0}︸︷︷︸
o=0
{1, 2, 3}︸ ︷︷ ︸
o=1
}
Π(P ) effectively partitions the domain of the variable h, where each disjoint
subset represents an output. The partition reflects the idea of what a passive
attacker can learn of secret inputs by backwards analysis of the program, from
the outputs to the inputs.
A simple example of Πl(P ) with h ranging over {0, 1, . . . , 7} is the following
if(l == 5) {
if(h < 4)
o = h;
else
o = 0;
} else
o = 0;
Πl(P ) then represents different program runs each with a different choice of l
from the set L = {0, 1, . . . }
{⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, {{0}{1}{2}{3}{4, 5, 6, 7}},⊥, . . . }
Every choice of l leads to the bottom partition except l = 5 where the first 4
high values can be distinguished. Clearly, an attacker who can choose any l
for Πl(P ) is much more powerful than one who has to start from fixed initial
values. An attacker which has the ability to maximise the leakage in one run
would choose Π5(P ), on the other hand, an attacker who can do multiple runs
could just “scan” the resulting partitions until he learned enough.
The next definitions show how to combine leakage of different programs
and different program runs of the same program using the join operation in
I(Σ) .
Definition 12. Given two programs P1, P2 which use the same set of variables
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and low initialisations l1, l2 the leakage of both programs combined is
Πl1(P1) unionsq Πl2(P2) (3.12)
If P1 and P2 are the same program then 3.12 represents the leakage of two
runs and can be generalised for any number of runs
Definition 13. Given program P and a given choice of inputs L = {l1, l2, . . . }
the partition of |L| runs is the join of the partitions Πl(P ) for all l⊔
l∈L
Πl(P ) (3.13)
For some applications, as will be shown in a later chapter, it is useful to
syntactically create a new program which just combines a number of programs.
Thus, the syntactic transformation encodes all program paths of all programs
in a single program. This is more amendable for program analyses which need
to reason about multiple program runs.
Definition 14. Given programs P1, P2 a single program P1unionsq2 exists such that
Π(P1unionsq2) = Π(P1) unionsq Π(P2) (3.14)
Given programs P1, P2, we define P1unionsq2 = P ′1;P
′
2 where the primed pro-
grams P ′1, P
′
2 are P1, P2 with all variables renamed to achieve disjoint variable
sets. If the two programs are syntactically equivalent, then this results in
self-composition [5]. For example, consider the two programs
P1 ≡ if (h == 0) x = 0 else x = 1, P2 ≡ if (h == 1) x = 0 else x = 1
with their partitions Π(P1) = {{0}{h 6= 0}} and Π(P2) = {{1}{h 6= 1}}. The
program P1unionsq2 is the concatentation of the previous programs with variable
renaming
P1unionsq2 ≡ h′ = h; if (h′ == 0) x′ = 0 else x′ = 1;
h′′ = h; if (h′′ == 1) x′′ = 0 else x′′ = 1
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The corresponding lattice element is the join, i.e. intersection of blocks, of the
individual programs P1 and P2
Π(P1unionsq2) = {{0}{1}{h 6= 0, 1} = {{0}{h 6= 0}} unionsq {{1}{h 6= 1}}.
3.5 Reasoning about loops in programs
To understand the leakage behaviour of a system in more detail the input/out-
put semantics approach might be too coarse. This is especially the case for
loops which introduce circular dependencies between program points. Tradi-
tionally, this requires externally provided loop invariants which capture the
necessary behaviour of the loop and verification property in question.
Up until recently, leakage inference for loops took a safe but very imprecise
approach. As soon as there was a confidential variable contained in the guard
or body of the loop then everything of the confidential information was con-
sidered leaked [13]. A subsequent paper then provided the first precise leakage
semantics for loops [38] which separates the leakage analysis in two parts: the
leakage of the loop guard and body. This section will summarise that the-
ory and then show an equivalent interpretation in the lattice of information.
Chains of elements in the lattice are seen as loop iterations and the leakage is
the entropy of the least upper bound of such chains.
3.5.1 Analytical approach
One possible way to analyse loop leakage is by breaking down the leakage in
different contributing parts in the program source code. Both the guard and
the body of a loop can be separate sources of leaks. It has been shown [38] that
those are two of the three components needed to provide a precise quantitative
analysis. The three components are:
guard: the information of the number of iterations of the loop
body: the information of the output given the knowledge of the number of
iterations
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collisions: the information of the number of iterations given knowledge of the
output
The idea is that the leakage of a looping program, denoted L(P ), is given by
the sum of information leaked by the guard and the body minus the ambiguity
given by the collisions. In terms of random variables (which will be formally
defined later on) this can be expressed as follows [40]:
L(P ) = H(NIterations(P ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
guard
+H(P |NIterations(P ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
body
−H(NIterations(P )|P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
collisions
Let us illustrate this formula with an example and its corresponding state
transformer in table 3.1
l=0;
while(l < h) {
if (h==2) l=3; else l++;
}
and suppose h,l are two bit variables with range {0, 1, 2, 3} and all values of
h are equally likely. Then the loop terminates in 0 iterations with probability
0.25 (i.e. only when h=0); it terminates in 1 iterations with probability 0.5
(i.e. only when h=1 and h=2), it never terminates after 2 iterations and finally
it terminates in 3 iterations with probability 0.25 (i.e. only when h=3). This
information about the partitioning of the inputs by the number of iterations
the loop needs to terminate makes up the first ingredient of L(P ):
H(NIterations(P ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
guard
= H(0.25, 0.5, 0.25)
For the body leakage, notice that for iterations 0 and 3 no uncertainty is
left about the secret (0 bits of information, see table 3.1), and only in the case
of 1 iteration the body leaks the information that h=1 or h=2 through its two
distinguishable outputs (1 bit of information). This amounts to:
H(P |NIterations(P ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
body
= 0.25 ∗ 0 + 0.25 ∗ 0 + 0.5 ∗ 1
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h = 0
0−−−−−−→ l = 0
h = 1
1−−−−−−→ l = 1
h = 2
1−−−−−−→ l = 3
h = 3
3−−−−−−→ l = 3
Table 3.1: State transformer: start
iteration→ end
For the collisions, notice that the output l=3 can be the result of 1 or 3
iterations, both resulting in the same output l=3. This setup generates 1 bit of
uncertainty about the number of iterations (it could be one or three iterations)
with probability 0.5. This gives the last element of the leakage formula:
H(NIterations(P )|P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
collisions
= 0.5 ∗ 1
For this particular program the leakage is then
H(0.25, 0.5, 0.25) + 0.25 ∗ 0 + 0.25 ∗ 0 + 0.5 ∗ 1− 0.5 ∗ 1 =
H(0.25, 0.5, 0.25) = 1.5
That 1.5 is the correct amount leaked can be checked with the following intu-
ition. An attacker observing the output of the program observes l=0 in which
case he knows that h=0; he observes l=1 in which case he knows that h=1; he
observes l=3 in which case he knows that h=2 or h=3. These three observations
have probability (0.25, 0.25, 0.5) and so the leakage given the observations is
H(0.25, 0.5, 0.25) = 1.5
We are now going to make this argument formal following [38].
3.5.2 The random variable NIterations
Given a looping program P ≡ while e M that only depends on a high in-
put variable h let us associate the random variable NIterations, or NItP in
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shorthand, to P .
NItP is the random variable where its values denote “number of iterations
the loop terminates in”. The associated distribution p(NItP = n) is the sum
of the probabilities of all values of h such that for those values P terminates
in n iterations.
p(NItP = n) =
∑
{p(h = v)|P (v) terminates in n iterations}
The next proposition shows that the analytical approach of separating guard
and body leakage results in the same leakage as in definition 3.11.
Proposition 3.
H(Π(P )) = H(NItP) +H(Π(P )|NItP)−H(NItP|Π(P ))
Proof. We use the information theoretical equality
H(Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X)−H(X|Y ) (3.15)
which is true by definition of the conditional entropy
H(X) +H(Y |X)−H(X|Y ) = H(X) +H(Y,X)−H(X)−H(X|Y ) =
H(X) +H(Y,X)−H(X)−H(X, Y ) +H(Y ) = H(Y )
The result then follows with replacing X = NItP, Y = Π(P ).
The elements on the right hand side of equation 3.15 have the following
meaning
1. H(NItP) is the leakage of the guard
2. H(Π(P )|NItP) is the leakage of the body
3. H(NItP|Π(P )) is the measure of the collisions of the loop
A collision is an observable value that can be generated in different iterations
of the loop.
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The random variable NItP can be approximated by the random variable
NItPn which restricts the number of possible values from 0, . . . , n, where the
last value n has the meaning “the loop terminates in > n iterations”. The
probabilities associated to NItPn are also an approximation of the probabilities
of NItP. They are defined by
p(NItPn = m) =
{
p(NItP = m) if m ≤ n,
1−∑{p(NItP = s)|s > n} otherwise.
3.5.3 Basic loop leakage definitions
Definition 15 (Leakage of collision free loop). The leakage of a collision free
loop while e M up to n iterations is given by
W (e,M)n = H(NItPn) +H(Π(P )|NItPn)
Proposition 4. ∀n ≥ 0, W (e,M)n ≤ W (e,M)n+1
Proof. The proof can be decomposed by showing that H(NItPn) ≤ H(NItPn+1)
which is true because NItPn+1 refines the distribution NItPn. To prove the other
component of the inequality, i.e. H(Π(P )|NItPn) ≤ H(Π(P )|NItPn+1) consider
the event e′ as the “loop terminates in n+ 1 iterations”. Using the definition
of conditional entropy this simplifies to
H(Π(P )|NItPn) =
∑
NItPn=e
p(e)H(Π(P )|NItPn = e)
≤
∑
NItPn=e
p(e)H(Π(P )|NItPn = e) + p(e′)H(Π(P )|e′)
=
∑
NItPn+1=e
p(e)H(Π(P )|NItPn+1 = e)
= H(Π(P )|NItPn+1)
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Using proposition 3 we can define the leakage of a loop as
lim
n→∞
W(e, M)n −H(NItP|Π(P )) (3.16)
which when there are no collisions simplifies to
lim
n→∞
W(e, M)n (3.17)
3.5.4 Examples
Let us apply the previous theory to the analysis of two looping programs. The
high input variable is a k-bit variable assuming possible values 0, . . . , 2k − 1
(i.e. no negative numbers).
Unbounded leakage with decreasing rate. Consider the following
simple loop with an increasing counter l:
l=0;
while (l != h) {
l=l+1;
}
No high variables appear in the body of the loop so there is no leakage in the
body, i.e
lim
n→∞
H(Π(P )|NItPn) = 0
Therefore we only need to study the behaviour of
lim
n→∞
H(NItPn)
The events associated to the random variable NItPn are:
(NItPn = i) =

0 = h, if i = 0
0 6= h, . . . , i 6= h ∧ i+ 1 = h, if i > 0
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thus every event is equally likely, i.e. p(NItPn = i) =
1
2k
. The entropy over all
possible guards is then
lim
n→∞
H(NItPn) = H(
1
2k
, . . . ,
1
2k
) = log(2k) = k
As expected all k bits of a variable are leaked in this loop, for all possible
k; however, 2k iterations are required to reveal k bits. We conclude that this
is an unbounded covert channel with decreasing rate k
2k
.
Bounded leakage with constant rate. The next example is a loop
with a decreasing counter and a slightly different guard expression
l=20;
while (h < l) {
l=l-1;
}
Again, since the body of the loop does not contain any high variable, the body
part of the leakage is 0
lim
n→∞
H(Π(P )|NItPn) = 0
Thus we only need to study the leakage of the guard.
After executing the program, l will be 20 if h ≥ 20 and will be h if 0 ≤
h < 20, i.e. h will be revealed if its value is in the interval 0 . . . 19.
The events associated to NItPn are:
(NItPn = i) =

h < 20− i ∧ h ≥ 20− (i+ 1) ≡
h = 20-(i+1), i > 0
h ≥ 20, i = 0
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Figure 3.1: Leakage in l=20; while (h < l) {l=l-1}
and
p(NItPn = i) =

2k−20
2k
if i = 0
1
2k
if 0 < i ≤ 20
0 if i > 20
The leakage is then given by
lim
n→∞
H(NItPn) =
H(
2k − 20
2k
,
1
2k
, . . . ,
1
2k
, 0, . . . , 0) =
−2
k − 20
2k
log(
2k − 20
2k
)− 20( 1
2k
log(
1
2k
))
This function is plotted in Figure 3.1 for k = {6 . . . 16}. The interesting ele-
ment in the graph is how it shows that for k around 6 bits the program is unsafe
(more than 2.2 bits of leakage) whereas for k from 14 upwards the program is
safe (around 0 bits of leakage).
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However, the uniform distribution is not the channel distribution. The
capacity of this channel is 4.3923 and is achieved by the distribution where
the only values with non zero probability for h are in the range {0 . . . 20} and
have uniform distribution3.
3.6 Loops in the lattice of information
This section presents a natural interpretation of the previous analysis of loops
in the lattice of information. The key result is that leakage of loops is the
semivaluation of the least upper bound of a chain of elements in the lattice of
information, where the chain is the interpretation of the different iterations of
the loop.
To understand the ideas let us consider again the program
l=0;
while(l < h) {
if (h==2) l=3; else l++;
}
and let us now study the partitions it generates. The loop terminating in 0
iterations will reveal that h=0 i.e. the partition W0 = {{0}{1, 2, 3}}; termina-
tion in 1 iteration will reveal h=1 if the output is 1 and h=2 if the output is
3 i.e. W1 = {{1}{2}{0, 3}}; the loop will never terminate in 2 iterations i.e.
W2 = {{0, 1, 2, 3}}; in 3 iterations it will reveal that h=3 given the output 3,
i.e. W3 = {{3}{0, 1, 2}}. Let us define W≤n as unionsqn≥i≥0Wi, we have then
W≤1 = W≤2 = W≤3 = {{0}{1}{2}{3}}
We also introduce an additional partition C to cater for the collisions in the
loop: the collision partition is C = {{0}{1}{2, 3}} because the inputs h=2 and
h=3 generate the same output in different number of iterations. Given these
partitions, the loop leakage is then
3We are ignoring the case where k < 5 where the capacity is less than 4.3923
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H(unionsqn≥0W≤n u C) = H({{0}{1}{2, 3}})
Notice now that the analytic and lattice interpretation give the same result:
assuming uniform distribution we get
H(0.25, 0.5, 0.25)︸ ︷︷ ︸
guard
+0.5 H(0.5, 0.5)︸ ︷︷ ︸
body
− 0.5 H(0.5, 0.5)︸ ︷︷ ︸
collisions
= 1.5
= H({{0}{1}{2, 3}})
We can interpret looping programs in the lattice of information as least
upper bounds of increasing sequences; for some loops (those with collisions)
this is not immediately true: however we will show that all loops can be
interpreted as the meet of the least upper bound of an increasing sequence
and a point in the lattice representing the collisions.
3.6.1 Algebraic interpretation
Given a loop W , let Wn be the program W up to the nth iteration. The
random variable associated to Wn is a partition where only the outputs of
W up to the nth iteration are distinguished. Thus, Wn+1 will refine Wn by
introducing additional blocks.
As a simple example of a collision free program consider the “linear search”
program P below
l=0;
while (l < h) {
l=l+1;
}
We get the following corresponding family of partitions of states Pn:
Pn = {{0}, {1} . . . , {n− 1}, {x| x ≥ n}}
The following proposition establishes the relation between collision free
loops and the chain Wn being increasing:
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Proposition 5. For all n, Wn v Wn+1 iff the loop W is collision-free.
Proof. The direction ⇒ follows immediately from the definition of collision.
For the ⇐ suppose Wn 6v Wn+1, then at least a block in Wn+1 is not a refine-
ment of a block in Wn, e.g. {{a}, {b, c}} in Wn and {{a, b, c}} in Wn+1 and by
definition of Wn either {{a} or {b, c}} (w.l.g. we can say is {a}) corresponds
to an output o after ≤ n iterations. Then {{a, b, c}} in Wn+1 corresponds to
a collision, namely the collision which sends a, b, c to the same output o in a
different number of iterations.
Proposition 6. The random variable W of a collision-free loop is the Kleene
fixpoint unionsqn≥0Wn of the chain (Wn)n≥0.
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 5 and the fact that the number of
states is finite.
Theorem 2. Given a collision-free loop while e M, the leakage limn→∞W (e,M)n
is equal to the semivaluation H(unionsqn≥0Wn).
Proof. This follows from Proposition 6.
Also note that in this case the chain W0 v W1 v . . . satisfies the ascending
chain condition. There exists an integer n such that Wm = Wn for all m > n,
because Wi+1 destructively refines or “splits” a finite block of Wi into smaller
equivalence classes.
3.6.2 Loops with collisions
Let us look at the colliding program shown in Figure 3.2. It consists of two
iterations, represented by functions f1 and f2.
The exact partition for this program is
P = {{a, a′}, {x, x′, y}, {c}}
The chain of partitions associated to the program is the following:
W1 = {{a, a′}, {x, x′}, {y, c}}
W2 = {{a, a′}, {x, x′, y}, {c}}
45
3.6 LOOPS IN THE LATTICE OF INFORMATION
a
x
x'
y
c
b
b'
b''
a'f1
f2
Figure 3.2: Two iterations with one collision at b′
We see that W2 extends the block containing x, x
′ with y because all three of
them have the same image b′. This reflects the idea of collisions, namely that
two (or more) elements of the codomain of two different iteration functions,
here f1 and f2, coincide. The result is that their inverse images are indistin-
guishable from one another and therefore end up being in the same block, here
{x, x′, y}. Then, W2 is equal to P . However, because W2 extends a block in
W1 this is not an ascending chain anymore; actually by choosing a distribution
assigning probability 0 to c, we can see that H(W1) > H(W2) and therefore
theorem 2 is false in case of collisions.
To address this problem we first introduce a trick to transform a sequence of
partitions into an ascending chain of partitions: given a sequence of partitions
(Wi)i≥0 define the sequence (W≤i)i≥0 by
W≤i = unionsqj≤iWj
It is easy to see that (W≤i)i≥0 is an increasing chain.
Define now the collision equivalence of a loop W as the reflexive and tran-
sitive closure of the relation σ 'C σ′ iff σ, σ′ generate the same output from
different iterations.
We are now ready to relate the leakage of arbitrary loops with semivalua-
tions on LoI.
Theorem 3. The leakage of an arbitrary loop as in definition 3.16 is equivalent
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to semivaluating the meet of the least upper bound of its increasing chain W≤n
and its collision partition C, i.e.
lim
n→∞
W(e, M)n −H(NItP|Π(P )) = H(unionsqn≥0W≤n u C)
Proof. Notice first that increasing chains xn with a maximal element in a
lattice do distribute, i.e.:
(unionsqn≥0xn) u y = unionsqn≥0(xn u y)
Assuming distributivity the argument is then easy to show:
(unionsqn≥0W≤n u C) = unionsqn≥0 (W≤n u C)
Notice now that (W≤n uC)n≥0 is a chain cofinal to the sequence (Wn)n≥0 and
so we can conclude that
unionsqn≥0(W≤n uC) is the partition whose semivaluation corresponds to W (e,M).
Notice the generality of the lattice approach: we can replace Shannon en-
tropy H with any real valued map from the lattice of information F and we
get a definition of leakage for loops as follows:
F (unionsqn≥0(Wn u C)).
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Chapter 4
Exact Leakage Quantification by
Complete Enumeration
We start the first chapter of automated techniques to calculate leakage by
the most straightforward brute-force technique: complete enumeration of all
possible confidential inputs to a program and evaluating its leakage, usually
assuming uniform input distribution. This approach is an exact method as it
calculates the correct entropy quantity by running the program on all inputs.
This simple analysis is included for three reasons
• to motivate the use of smarter approximate methods presented in later
chapters
• it has proven to be a useful tool during research and development of more
advanced tools and was the starting point of my research
• a safe upper bound on the exact leakage has been formalised in cases
where not all inputs have been treated
The analysis has been implemented in a tool and has been tested on 82
different programs over the years. Two of those programs and their analysis
will be covered in this chapter as case studies.
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Input: Program text P ,Value range H
Output: Π(P ), NItP
Π(P ) = ∅
NItP = ∅
for h ∈ H do
o, n← P (h)
Π(P )← attach(o, Π(P ), {h})
NItP ← attach(n, NItP, {h})
end
Algorithm 1: Iteratively calculating partitions Π(P ) and NItP
4.1 Analysis
4.1.1 Objective
The objective of this analysis is to calculate the exact loop leakage for a simple
while language (as presented in section 2.1) with a single loop in the program
text. The leakage calculation should implement the formulas from section
3.5.1. Please refer to that section for the notation used.
4.1.2 Algorithm
For the complete enumeration we iteratively compute two partitions represent-
ing Π(P ) and NItP according to the algorithm 1. Input to the algorithm are
the program P and the range of secret values H. The program is run with only
the secret value h as input; its return value is the computed output observation
o and the last iteration count of the loop n.
The algorithm uses the helper function attach(label, partition, block)
which adds block block to the equivalence class with label label from partition
partition. It always returns the updated partition. The semantics of attach
are self-explanatory, e.g.
attach(i, ∅, {1, 2}) = {{1, 2}i}
attach(i, {{0}j{1, 2}i}, {3, 4}}) = {{0}j{1, 2, 3, 4}i}
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Following from that, the program and loop leakage of the resulting parti-
tions can be calculated easily. According to proposition 3, the program leakage
is H(Π(P )) and the loop leakage is calculated by the conditioning: leakage of
the guard is H(NItP), leakage of the body H(Π(P )|NItP) and collision leakage
is H(NItP|Π(P )).
The conditional entropy is calculated using the conditioning of partitions
from equations 3.7 and 3.8 and by its definition
H(Π(P )|NItP) =
∑
N
p(NItP = n)H(Π(P )|NItP = n).
Here, we assume that NItP = n is a shorthand for selecting the block with label
n from NItP. Thus, every block is selected and the entropy of the conditional is
calculated according to equation 3.8. As we consider uniform distribution the
probability reduces to block counting: p(NItP = n) =
|NItP=n|P
i∈N |NItP=i| (see section
2.5).
4.1.3 Example
Let us take the following example with range of h ∈ H = {0, 1, 2, 3}.
l=0;
while(l<h) {
if(h==2 || h==3)
l=3;
else
l++;
}
The algorithm 1 finds the following two partitions
Π(P ) = {{0}0{2, 3}3{1}1}
NItP = {{0}0{1, 2, 3}1}
To calculate the leakage of the guard we have to only consider the block NItP =
1 ≡ {1, 2, 3}, thus p(NItP = 1) = 34 = 0.75. Plugging in equation 3.8 results in
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the following partition for the conditioning
(Π(P )|NItP = 1) = {{1}{2, 3}}
which results in the entropy
H(Π(P )|NItP = 1) = 0.75H(1
3
,
2
3
)
Notice that there is no collision leakage because NItP v Π(P ). If there
was leakage it would work exactly in the same way as the leakage in the body,
except that we would also need identifying labels describing which output value
belongs to which equivalence class of Π(P ) for the selection and intersection
process. See section 3.5.1 for more information.
Thus the leakage of this loop amounts to
H(Π(P )) = H(
1
4
,
2
4
,
1
4
) = 1.5
H(Π(P )) = H(NItP) +H(Π(P )|NItP) = H(1
4
,
3
4
) + 0.75H(
1
3
,
2
3
)
= 1.5
4.2 Safe upper bound
An information theoretical upper bound can be provided for Π(P ) if the anal-
ysis is not completely run on the set of all inputs; this is most often the case
when the algorithm is aborted before normal termination. This upper bound
is safe, which means that it is always greater than or equal to the true, precise
leakage. Let us assume that all variables have k bits thus the space of the
confidential variable H is 2k.
The reasons for not completing the enumeration are obvious
• P (h) could be an expensive function to evaluate
• 2k could be very large
• some h could cause P (h) to not terminate
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Let us assume that P is only run on the first m inputs, thus m < 2k then
the entropy of Π(P ) is
H(Π(P )m) = H(p1, . . . , pu, q)
with u ≤ m and q = 1−∑ui=1 pi. Remember that using the partition-view as
intuition, pi is the sum of the probability of all inputs leading to the output
representing the ith equivalence class. There are 2k − m inputs untreated
sharing a probability of q. The worst-case assumption is that every remaining
input will result in a new, distinguishable observation with probability q
2k−m ,
i.e. distributing the remaining probability q over the untreated inputs.
Proposition 7. Let k be the size of the secret, and the entropy calculated so
far for m inputs is
H(Π(P )m) = H(p1, . . . , pu, q) (4.1)
with u ≤ m and q = 1−∑ui=1 pi. A safe leakage upper bound is then calculated
as follows
H(Πˆ(P )m) = H(p1, . . . , pu,
q
2k −m, . . . ,
q
2k −m) (4.2)
with Πˆ(P )m being the partition which distributes the remaining probability q
over the untreated inputs.
Proof. The choice of uniform fractions q
2k−m is motivated by equation 2.2 which
is shown to maximise entropy. The probabilities pi are calculated using the
maximum likelihood estimator ni
2k
with ni being the cardinality of the ith equiv-
alence class. For proving the upper bound we also assume that every pi is
“complete”, i.e. no other inputs lead to the same output. This is generally
not the case but does not influence the upper bound.
There are two extreme cases:
I. no untreated input adds a new observation. The leakage is then bound
by log2(u) which is clearly less or equal to the upper bound.
II. assume m = u, i.e. when every input so far generated a unique ob-
servation, and also assuming that the remaining inputs show the same
behaviour, then the precise leakage and our upper bound in 4.2 coincide.
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As an illustrative example, let us take the parameters 2k = 8,m = 4 and
the partition
Π(P )m ≡ {{1, 2}{3, 4} {5, 6, 7, 8}︸ ︷︷ ︸
“q”
}
Thus q = 4
8
= 0.5, 2k −m = 8− 4 = 4 and each new singleton class is assigned
the probability 0.5
4
= 1
8
. The upper bound partition is then
Πˆ(P )m ≡ {{1, 2}{3, 4}{5}{6}{7}{8}}
and its entropy is
H(Πˆ(P )m) = H(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
) = 2.5
out of the possible log(8) = 3 bit.
4.3 Case studies
The following two case studies show the application of the technique developed
in this chapter. The examples also serve as a way to compare human intuition
of leakage through code review with automatically computed leakage. We learn
that manual code review is not appropriate to calculate or estimate leakage
which is an argument for tool support.
4.3.1 Square root
The integer square root is defined as follows
sqrt(x) = b√xc
There are many different ways of implementing this definition in a while
language. One of the simplest is
l=0;
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while(l*l <= h) {
l++;
}
l--;
which calculates l=sqrt(h), therefore l contains the largest integer such that
l*l <= h. Our interest is to know how many bits of the secret h leak into
l. This example is straightforward, half the bits of h minus the remainder
removed by the floor operation are revealed by l after the execution of the
program. In this case, calculating the leakage is feasible and a code reviewer
can accurately reason about the revealed quantity.
But what about other implementations; do they leak the same amount and
can we rely on our intuition to deduce the leakage? The next program is an
equivalent implementation, computing res=sqrt(num).
curLog=16; res=0; flag=1;
nextNum=0; resAdd=0;
while(curLog > 0 && flag == 1) {
nextNum = num - (res << curLog);
curLog = curLog-1;
if(nextNum > 0) {
resAdd = (1 << curLog);
nextNum = nextNum - (resAdd << curLog);
if(nextNum > 0) {
num = nextNum;
res = res | resAdd;
} else {
if(nextNum == 0) {
res = res | resAdd;
flag=0;
}}}}
This version is so complex that, for most programmers it is hard to even
guess what this program is doing. Calculating the leakage from num to res
without tool-support is very difficult and error-prone. However, our tool re-
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vealed that this implementation leaks all of the input bits to the output1;
further, it showed that the variables nextNum and flag are acting as covert
channels and are responsible for the high leakage. This is reflected in the
following analysis output, with num being a 5 bit variable:
Guard leak: 0.3998 Body leak: 4.6002
Collision: 0.0000 Loop leaks: 5.0000
The 5 bit leakage means that we can uniquely identify the input by ob-
serving the output values alone. However, when we remove nextNum and flag
from the calculation we get:
Guard leak: 0.3998 Body leak: 2.2234
Collision: 0.0000 Loop leaks: 2.6232
Reducing the overall leakage from 5 to 2.62 bits – almost half the original
leakage.
To summarise, different implementations of the same algorithm can have
very different leakage behaviour and we can not always rely on intuition. Fur-
ther, we showed that automated quantitative analysis could help programmers
identify leaking components in algorithms and could provide ways to minimise
such information leakages by eliminating side-channels.
4.3.2 Prime numbers
Consider the following program:
l=2;
while (h % l > 0) {
l++;
}
which computes the smallest divisor of a secret h. Again, we are interested
in the information leaked from the secret h to the public variable l. In that
respect, this program is clearly unsafe: whenever h is prime the whole secret
will be disclosed. But how much do non-prime inputs contribute to the leakage?
1All observable variables together build the output
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One possible way to approach this question is by using the Prime Number
Theorem which states that
The proportion of primes less than a k bit number h is asymptotic
to 1/ lnh.
By this theorem one could derive the following estimate for the leakage: For
all k the above program leaks 1.94 bits.
The idea behind this estimation is the following: the probability of a prime
within 2k possible values can be approximated by 1
ln(2k)
and in this case it leaks
everything as stated above; so far this gives a leakage of k
ln(2k)
= 1.442. The
remaining 0.5 to reach the total of 1.94 bits is obtained by observing that half
of the numbers are divisible by 2. The knowledge that a number is divisible
by 2 consists of 1 bit: if the least bit of a number is 0 then it is divisible by
2. Multiplying this single bit by the probability of being in that set yields the
required 0.5 bit.
However, this argument has two flaws:
1. It does not take into account the non-primes which are divisible by any
number other than 2. Incorporating the leakage generated by these num-
bers may require more substantial mathematics
2. It does not takes into account that the program does not terminate if
the secret is 1
Using the algorithm 1 we can compute the real leakage. Below is an output
of the system computing the leakage of the program for a 3 bit secret:
[h -> 1] caused timeout
<l = 2 h = 4 > --0--> <l = 2 h = 4 >
<l = 2 h = 6 > --0--> <l = 2 h = 6 >
<l = 2 h = 2 > --0--> <l = 2 h = 2 >
<l = 2 h = 0 > --0--> <l = 2 h = 0 >
<l = 2 h = 3 > --1--> <l = 3 h = 3 >
<l = 2 h = 5 > --3--> <l = 5 h = 5 >
<l = 2 h = 7 > --5--> <l = 7 h = 7 >
Analysis:
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Guard leak: 1.6645 Body leak: 0.0000
Collision: 0.0000 Loop leaks: 1.6645
Upper Bound Analysis
Remaining (1-p) = 0.1250
Safe upperbound: 2.0000
The output starts by listing input/output variable configurations of the
program, e.g. the second line means the program on inputs l = 2, h = 4
terminated after 0 iterations with the values l = 2, h = 4, i.e. no computation
took place.
The output of the analysis tool explains the actual leakage of the program.
For a 3 bit secret a leakage of 1.6645 is calculated: in the three cases when h
is prime (3
7
of the cases) the observer will learn the whole secret (log(7) bits
of information), whereas in the other 4 cases one will know that the secret is
one of the 4 possible non prime numbers (log(7)− log(4) bits of information).
The leakage from the observable output is hence
3
7
log(7) +
4
7
log(
7
4
) = 1.6645
The first line of the output ([h -> 1] caused timeout ) indicates that
when the variable h was initialised with the value 1 then the program did not
terminate in the allowed time. The Upper Bound Analysis is using the upper
bounds of Proposition 7 exactly in such cases when one or more inputs cause
(observable) non-termination:
• The lower bound 1.6645 is the leakage where non-terminating inputs are
ignored, i.e. the non-terminating inputs contribute 0 to the leakage.
• The upper bound 2 is obtained by considering the case where the non-
terminating input contributes maximally to the leakage as proved in
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Secret size (bits) Leakage (terminating) Upper Bound Time
3 1.6645 2 0.010s
4 1.989 2.2028 0.014s
8 3.0890 3.1138 0.118s
10 3.3897 3.3976 0.960s
16 3.9298 3.9302 7m7s
Table 4.1: Leakage for the Primes program
Proposition 7:
q =
1
8
, 2k = 8, m = 7,
q
2k −m =
1
8
Π(P ) = {{0, 2, 4, 6}{3}{5}{7}{1}}
= H(
4
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
) = 2
Table 4.1 shows the leakage, refined upper bounds, and runtime of the analysis
for different sizes of the secret. The runtime column demonstrates well how
this analysis does not scale. This is only a one dimensional secret space (one
secret variable) of maximally 16 bit, and a very short program. Clearly, the
runtime is prohibitively long.
To summarise, in respect to this example it has become clear that tool
support is needed to calculate leakage. Even very short programs, like the one
presented, can expose difficult leakage behaviours which are too error-prone
to be calculated by humans. This example also demonstrated that the new
bounds calculate meaningful results even in the presence of non-termination
inputs.
4.4 Review of technique
This chapter described a dynamic analysis to evaluate the leakage of a program
written in a while language. However, the analysis is not limited to while
languages but can be performed on any code which is executable. Also it
calculates the precise leakage, including the leakage breakdown in case of loops.
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Unfortunately, the runtime of the algorithm depends on the execution time of
the program multiplied by the size of the secret, which is very expensive in
general. Ideally, the runtime would be independent of either one of the two
variables.
Apart from the precise leakage calculation, the features described above
present drawbacks. The fact that the code has to be executable restricts the
programs which can be analysed. Either a whole program has to be analysed,
which is executable but consists of a large number of lines of code, or an
executable slice of a program has to be generated which is a whole research area
in itself. Thus, the analysis of, for example, a module or individual function
out of a more complex program, such as a kernel module, is not possible.
Another subtle difficulty introduced by the enumeration of the secret input
is that the input has to be easily enumerable. While this is trivial for simple
datatypes like integers, if more complex datastructures, which by definition
follow a certain structure, were used as secret input then this enumeration is
not straightforward anymore.
Finally, the dynamic analysis brings with it the obvious disadvantages when
it comes to security applications: if the code to be analysed is critical to a
system and one would want to know beforehand if there is leakage or not, then
this analysis is not suitable either.
The next chapters try to address these shortcomings by developing more
advanced analyses.
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Chapter 5
AQUA Tool
This chapter describes a different tool developed for this thesis which addresses
some of the weaknesses of the previous approach to automatically calculating
leakage. Most importantly, this analysis has three objectives:
• Employ static analysis techniques instead of dynamic execution
• Address scalability issues
• Move away from while-languages to ANSI-C
To achieve the objectives the new technique exploits the original definition
of noninterference and applies symbolic verification methods instead of the
explicit execution of the program.
The main idea for this work stems from multiple recent papers [59, 4, 62]
which describe how the noninterference property can be checked using conven-
tional program verification techniques such as verification of safety properties.
The most important source is the work from Backes, Ko¨pf, and Rybalchenko
[4].
Let us start with some observations about noninterference. A program P
is noninterfering if it satisfies the well-known equation from Joshi and Leino
HH;P ;HH = P ;HH
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A B C
Figure 5.1: Distinction in class B as Non-Interference violation
which can be interpreted as: running a program does not create more distinc-
tions on the secret values.
It is known that if a program is non-interfering then it has no leakage or
equivalently Π(P ) = ⊥ [14]. Thus, it should be possible to use the violation
of this property as a way to quantify leakage.
A violation of noninterference is shown in the figure 5.1. Each oval describes
an equivalence class and the four dots inside the top figure are the elements
in the confidential space. Let us take the top1 figure as an initial partition of
the secret and the bottom figure as Π(P ). A violation of noninterference is
the arrow to the B equivalence class which creates a distinction between two
related secret values, i.e. A and B now distinguish the two input values in the
first equivalence class of the initial partition.
Every violation of NI is potentially an additional distinction between two
secret values. However, unless the program leaks everything, this does not
need to be the general case, because two secret values might be distinguished
but happen to fall in an existing equivalence class.
Definition 16 (NI violation). A noninterference violation (or NI violation)
is a counterexample to the NI property.
However, to completely find the partition Π(P ) using NI violations alone a
large number of counterexamples would need to be found. For k bit variables,
1Not to confuse with > partition
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2k(2k − 1)/2 pairs of inputs would need to be evaluated, much larger than the
actual secret space. Therefore, the approach has to be modified to be practical.
The approach in this chapter is based on the assumption that there is
leakage. Using a combination of techniques, we compute two characteristics of
the partition Π(P ) separately:
• Number of distinct outputs in the program with respect to the confiden-
tial variables, i.e. number of equivalence classes
• Sizes of inverse images of every distinct output, i.e. equivalence class
sizes
For example, let us take the one-liner program P (h) = h % 4 where h is 4
bit. Then Π(P ) is
{{4, 8, 12, 16}{1, 5, 9, 13}{2, 6, 10, 14}{3, 7, 11, 15}}
which results in 4 distinct outputs (since the program is calculating modulo
4) and all equivalence classes have size 4 as well. The tool presented in this
chapter, called AQuA (Automated Quantitative Analysis), calculates these
two quantities automatically from the source code of the program; the resulting
partition is then ready to be quantified.
At the end of the chapter, a benchmark shows the performance of the tool
on examples from the literature and other relevant pieces of code. The appli-
cation section describes how AQuA could be applied to the area of statistical
databases to reason about leakage of combined queries.
This work has been published at the proceedings of the FAST (Formal
Aspect of Security and Trust) workshop [29] in LNCS.
5.1 Automation by applying self-composition
A property is a set of execution traces where checking if a trace is a member
of the property does not depend on any other traces in the property. A safety
property declares that something bad can never happen [34] and it can be
expressed as an invariance argument, or a predicate on states.
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Definition 17 (Safety Property). A safety property is a set of traces of a
program P where there exists some predicate φ(·) which every execution trace
satisfies.
S ⊆ [[P ]]. ∀s ∈ S. φ(s)
A safety problem is then the decision on the membership to a safety prop-
erty.
Noninterference is not a safety property [43] however Terauchi and Aiken
[59] showed that it is almost a safety property and defined it as 2-safety prop-
erty. Such a property can be refuted by observing two finite traces. The
same authors also showed that Noninterference can be checked using self-
composition (by Barthe et. al. [5]) which reduces a 2-safety problem into
a safety problem.
Self-composition is a simple program transformation which enables the pro-
gram P to be evaluated only once by sequencing a copy of P , named P ′, where
all variables have been replaced by fresh copies which do not appear in P sim-
ply as follows
P ;P ′
By executing this self-composed program two “runs” of the program P are
performed in one piece of code.
Using this technique, we can check 2-safety with the (un-)reachability of
some label. This is demonstrated as follows in pseudo code following Backes,
Ko¨pf, and Rybalchenko [4]
if(l == l’ && h ' h’)
P(h,l); P’(h’,l’)
if(l != l’) ERROR
The assumption that an attacker can not learn anything about the secret
(i.e. for all h,h’. h ' h’) can be falsified by finding an execution path which
reaches the ERROR label. The reachability of this label can be efficiently checked
by off-the-shelf model checkers.
Thus, this approach is efficient for finding violations of the noninterference
property, or in other words of the initial assumption that all secret values are
indistinguishable.
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5.1.1 K-safety and quantitative information flow
The concept of 2-safety can be generalised to k-safety where k is the number
of traces needed to refute the property [16, 65]. Again, this property can be
reduced to a normal safety property and checked accordingly .
However, a negative result by Yasuoka and Terauchi [65] showed that in-
ferring, i.e. computing, quantitative information flow is not k-safety for any k.
Thus one can not simply use self-composition like in the noninterference case
to precisely calculate leakage.
To overcome this problem, we reformulate the reachability problem in a
way which assumes that there is leakage in P , i.e. that the secret input is not
the bottom partition. Starting from this assumption, the code from above is
modified as follows
assume(l = l’ && h = i)
P(h,l); P’(h’,l’)
assert(l != l’)
The initial assumption on the high equivalence is dropped and instead the
original high variable h is initialised with value i. Also, the primed variable
h’ is left uninitialised. As a next step, this program is fed to a SAT solver,
which when satisfiable found a model for this program where h’ is assigned a
value which is in a different equivalence class than h = i.
Iterating and extending this algorithm in the right way will necessarily find
the equivalence relation from equation 3.9.
5.2 Inferring QIF by SAT solving and model
counting
The previous section showed the core idea behind the analysis which takes the
“two program runs view” from Joshi and Leino’s interpretation of noninterfer-
ence and the translation to a constrained program which finds distinguishable
equivalence classes in the secret space. This section describes two algorithms
which perform the partition discovery.
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The two step process is best explained using the recurring password exam-
ple with 4 bit variable width and the secret input variable pwd:
if(pwd == 4) { return 1; } else { return 0; }
The first step of the method is to find a representative input for each possible
output. In our case, AQuA could find the set {4, 5}, for outputs 1 and 0,
respectively. This is accomplished using a SAT-based fixed point computation.
The next step runs on that set of representative inputs. For each input in
that set, the number of possible inputs are counted which lead to the same
implicit, distinct output. This step is accomplished using model counting.
5.2.1 Core algorithms
The method consists of two reachability analyses, which can be run either one
after another or interleaved.
The first analysis finds a set of inputs to which the original program pro-
duces distinct outputs for. That set has cardinality of the number of possible
outputs for the program. The second analysis counts the set of all inputs which
lead to the same output. This analysis is run on all members of the set of the
first analysis. Together, these two analyses discover the partition of the input
space according to the outputs of a program.
To a program P we associate two modified programs P 6= and P=, represent-
ing the two reachability questions. The two programs are defined as follows
P 6=(i) ≡ h = i;P ;P ′; assert(l! = l′)
P=(i) ≡ h = i;P ;P ′; assert(l = l′)
The program P is self-composed [5, 59] and is either asserting low-equality
or low-inequality on the output variable and its copy. Their argument is the
initialisation value for the input variable. This method works on any number
of input variables, but we simplify it to a single variable to ease readability.
The programs P 6= and P= are unwound into propositional formula and then
translated in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) in a standard fashion.
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Input: P 6=
Output: Sinput
Sinput ← ∅
h← random
Sinput ← Sinput ∪ {h}
while P 6=(h) not unsat do
(l, h′)← Run SAT solver on P 6=(h)
Sinput ← Sinput ∪ {h′}
h← h′
P 6= ← P 6= ∧ l′ 6= l
end
Algorithm 2: Calculation of Sinput using P 6=
Input: P=, Sinput
Output: M
M = ∅
while Sinput 6= ∅ do
h← s ∈ Sinput
#models← Run allSAT solver on P=(h)
M =M :: {#models}
Sinput ← Sinput \ {s}
end
Algorithm 3: Model counting of equivalence classes in Sinput
P 6= is solved using a number of SAT solver calls using a standard reacha-
bility algorithm (SAT-based fixed point calculation).
Algorithm 2 describes this input discovery. In each iteration it discovers a
new input h′ which does not lead to the same output as previous the input h.
The new input h′ is added to the set Sinput. The observable output l is added
to the formula as blocking clause, to avoid finding the same solution again in
a different iteration. This process is repeated until P 6= is unsatisfiable which
signifies that the search for Sinput elements is exhausted.
Given Sinput (or a subset of it) as result of Algorithm 2, we can use P=
to count the sizes of the equivalence classes represented by Sinput using model
counting. This process is displayed in Algorithm 3 and is straightforward to
understand.
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The algorithm calculates the size of the equivalence class [h]P= for every
h in Sinput by counting the satisfying models of P=(h). The output M of
Algorithm 3 is the partition Π(P ) of the original program P .
Proposition 8 (Correctness). The set Sinput from Algorithm 2 contains a
representative element for each possible equivalence class of Π(P ). Algorithm
3 calculates {[s1]P= , . . . , [sn]P=} with si ∈ Sinput which, according to (3.9), is
Π(P ).
Proof. Algorithm 2 terminates when P 6= is unsatisfiable. In every iteration
of the algorithm one distinct valuation of the boolean formula representing a
distinct output is removed by the blocking clause l′ 6= l; thus the assertion in
P 6= fails once all representative inputs leading to distinct outputs have been
found. As the inputs lead to distinct outputs, the model counting step in
Algorithm 3 find the size of every equivalence class.
Proposition 9 (Algorithm 2 leakage bounds). If Algorithm 2 completed with
an unsatisfiable P 6= then the channel capacity of P is bound from above by
log2(|Sinput|).
If the algorithm is in any other iteration, then the channel capacity of P is
bound from below by log2(|Sinput|).
Proof. Channel capacity is shown to be reached by the cardinality of the set
of events in equation (2.2). The set Sinput is by definition the cardinality of
possible unique outputs of program P when Algorithm 2 terminates, which
proves the bound from above.
In the case where the algorithm is interrupted early, program P has at
least as many outputs as the cardinality of Sinput as Spear is sound and
complete.
5.2.2 Implementation
The implementation builds up on a toolchain of existing tools, together with
some interfacing, language translations, and optimisations. See Figure 5.2 for
an overview.
AQuA has the following main features:
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Figure 5.2: Translation steps
• runs on a subset of ANSI C without memory allocation and with integer
secret variables
• no user interaction or code annotations needed except command line
options
• supports non-linear arithmetic and integer overflows
AQuA works on the equational intermediate representation of the CBMC
bounded model checker [17]. C code is translated by CBMC into a program
of constraints which in turn gets optimised through standard program analysis
techniques into cleaned up constraints2. This program then is self-composed
and user-provided source and sink variables get automatically annotated.
2CBMC adds some constraints which distorts the model counting.
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In a next step, the program is translated into the bit-vector arithmetic
Spear format of the Spear theorem prover [2]. At this point, AQuA will
spawn the two instances, P= and P 6=, from the input program P .
Algorithms 2 and 3 get executed sequentially on those two program ver-
sions. However, depending on the application and cost of the SAT queries,
once could also choose to execute them interleaved, by first calculating one
input to the program P= and then model counting that equivalence class. Ex-
ecuting the algorithms in this order could be beneficial because it allows to
calculate the entropy from below where intermediate results of the analysis
already provide a bound on the entropy.
For Algorithm 2, Spear will SAT solve P 6= directly and report the satisfying
model to the tool. The newly found inputs are stored until P 6= is reported to
be unsatisfiable.
For Algorithm 3, Spear will bit-blast P= down to CNF which in turn gets
model counted by either RelSat [6] or C2D. C2D is only used in case the
user specifies fast model counting through command line options. While the
counting is much faster on difficult problems than RelSat, the CNF instances
have to be transformed into a d-DNNF tree which is very costly in memory.
This is a trade-off between time and space. In most instances, RelSat is
fast enough, except in cases with multiple constraints on more than two secret
input variables. The decision which backend SAT solver to use is left as choice
to the user.
Once the partition Π(P ) is calculated, the user can choose which measure
to apply.
Loops
The first step of the program transformations is treating loops in an unsound
way, i.e. a user needs to define a fixed number of loop unwindings. This is a
inherent property of the choice of tools used, as CBMC is a bounded model
checker, which limit the number of iterations down to what counterexamples
can be found. While this is a real restriction in program verification – as bugs
can be missed in that way – it is not as crucial for our quantification purposes.
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In such cases Algorithm 2 detects at one point an input which contains all
inputs beyond the iteration bound. Using the principle of maximum entropy,
this “sink state” can be used to always safely over-approximate entropy (for
example see proposition 7 in section 4.2 for an explanation).
Let us assume we analyse a binary search examples with 15 unwindings of
the loop and 8 bit variables. AQuA reports the partition
Partition:
{241}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}{1}: 256
where the number in the brackets are the model counts. The analysis output
describes 15 singleton blocks and one sink block with a model count of the
remaining 241 unprocessed inputs. When applying a measure, the 241 inputs
could be distributed in singleton blocks as well which would over-approximate
(and in this case actually exactly find) the leakage of the input program.
Proposition 10 (Sound loop leakage). For any unwinding bound n of program
P , its leakage can be overapproximated from the resulting partition Π(P )n by
distributing its “sink state” block into singleton blocks.
Proof. Let us assume partition Π(P )n is the result of n unwindings of P , and
Π(P )m ism unwindings of P , wherem ≥ n. If every element of the “sink state”
block b ∈ Π(P )n is distributed in individual blocks, the partition denoted
as Πˆ(P )n, then Π(P )m v Πˆ(P )n. From property 3.4 of the semivaluation
definition it follows that H(Π(P )m) v H(Πˆ(P )n).
5.2.3 Worked example
Let us demonstrate each step in the analysis on a small but non-trivial example.
The leakage of the polynomial 5h2 + 2h is analysed by the simple translation
to a C program
int main() {
int l,h;
l = 5*h*h+2*h;
}
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where as usual h is the confidential variable and all variables are 8 bit wide.
Constraint translation. CBMC translates this program in the following
constraint form
l@1#1 == 2 * h@1#0 + 5 * h@1#0 * h@1#0
P 6= and P= translation. AQuA translates these constraints into Spear
format. The program here is P=, while P 6= would be the same program with
the last line inverted.
v 1.0
d l11__:i8 l11sp2__:i8 l11sp0__:i8 h10__:i8 l11sp1__:i8 l11:i8
l11sp2:i8 l11sp0:i8 l11sp1:i8 h10:i8
p = h10 23:i8 # initialisation of the secret to 23
c l11sp1 * 5:i8 h10
c l11sp0 * 2:i8 h10
c l11sp2 * l11sp1 h10
c l11 + l11sp0 l11sp2
c l11sp1__ * 5:i8 h10__ # start of self-composition
c l11sp0__ * 2:i8 h10__
c l11sp2__ * l11sp1__ h10__
c l11__ + l11sp0__ l11sp2__
p = l11__ l11 # equality assertion
We notice the naive self-composition where the copy variables are identified
by double underscores. Also, we assume that the initialisation of 23 is a rep-
resentative input for some equivalence class.
Model Counting. Spear translates this program into CNF which is
then model counted by invoking an all SAT solver such as Relsat. The SAT
solver will return with an answer such as
Number of solutions: 16
Solution 1: 1 3 4 10 11 12
18 20 21 22 23 25 27 28 29 30 32
36 37 38 39 41 43 45 48 51 52 54
71
5.2 INFERRING QIF BY SAT SOLVING AND MODEL COUNTING
56 57 58 59 60 62 64 65 66 69 70
71 72 74 75 79 85 86 89 90 91 92
94 97 98 103 107 108 110 112 113
114 115 116 118 120 121 123 124
125 126 131 132 133 137 141 145
151 152 155 156 157 158 160 162
163 165 171 172 175 176 177 183
184 189 190 192 193 194 196 199
203 204 206 209 210 215 216 218
228 230 231 232 234 247 248 250
251 252 255 256 257 261 268 269
270 272 273 279 280 282 283 287
293 294 295 296 298 299 300 302
303 304 306 307 308 310
...
where each number in the solutions represents an active bit of a variable in
the boolean formula. To get the actual members of this equivalence class, all
solutions can be mapped back to individual variables (e.g. here the variable
h consists of the 8 variables 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34) and the values are
extracted by matching it against the active bits in the solution. Note that the
enumeration of equivalence classes is optional and not part of the normal oper-
ation of AQuA. In normal operation only equivalence class sizes are calculated
which avoids enumeration.
What AQuA users see. All of this is done fully automatically. A user
of AQuA only has to execute
aqua mult.c
and will see the following answer:
Program leaks 5.2500 bits (of 8.0000)
Partition:
{4}{4}{4}{8}{4}{16}{4}{4}{4}{8}{4}{4}{4}{4}
{8}{4}{4}{16}{4}{4}{4}{8}{4}{4}{8}{4}{16}{8}
{4}{4}{4}{4}{8}{4}{4}{16}{4}{4}{8}{4}{4}{4}{4}{4}: 256
72
5.2 INFERRING QIF BY SAT SOLVING AND MODEL COUNTING
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
h
m
o
d(5
 * 
h^
2 +
 2 
* h
, 2
56
)
Figure 5.3: Polynomial 5h2 + 2h modulo 256 for h = {1, . . . , 256}
What does this actually mean? As the output variable is also a 8 bit
variable, we can map the domain of the polynomial to a space modulo 256.
This can be seen in figure 5.3. Also, for this example we have extracted an
arbitrary equivalence class and its members are
47, 175, 239, 111, 79, 207, 143, 15,
183, 247, 55, 119, 215, 87, 23, 151
As they are all in the same equivalence class, these secrets should be indistin-
guishable for an attacker observing the output of the polynomial. A simple
test in R verifies this; the values above are stored in the vector ps.
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Program #h range Σh bits P 6= Time P 6= + P= Time Spear LOC
CRC8 1h.c 1 8 bit 8 17.36s 32.68s 370
CRC8 2h.c 2 8 bit 16 34.93s 1m18.74s 763
sum3.c† 3 0 . . . 9 9.96 (103) 0.19s 0.95s 16
sum10.c? 10 0 . . . 5 25.84 (610) 1.59s 3m30.76s 51
nonlinear.c 1 16 bit 16 0.04s 13.46s 20
search30.c* 1 8 bit 8 0.84s 2.56s 186
auction.c†? 3 20 bit 60 0.06s 16.90s 42
Table 5.1: Performance examples. * 30 loop unrollings; † from [4]; ? counted
with C2D Machine: Linux, Intel Core 2 Duo 2GHz
> 5*ps^2+2*ps
[1] 11139 153475 286083 61827 31363 214659 102531
[11] 1155 167811 305539 15235 71043 231555 38019 2691 114307
> mod(5*ps^2+2*ps,256)
[1] 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
While all the values evaluate to different points in the polynomial (as it is a
strictly increasing function) they all collapse to the same value under modulo
256. Thus, they are indistinguishable when stored in a variable of 8 bit. These
16 points have been highlighted in figure 5.3. Naturally, they lie on a horizontal
line at 131. This example also shows how precise modelling of integer overflows
is crucial for making the analysis work.
5.3 Experiments
Table 5.1 provides a performance benchmark comparing the two algorithms
for P 6= and P= on different problems. The run times have been split between
Algorithm 2 to calculate P 6= and the total run time; the lines of code (LOC)
column is a measure of the size of the generated code in Spear format.
The biggest example is a full CRC8 checksum implementation where the
input are two char variables (16 bit). The program has been chosen because
its output is well known and can serve as a check if AQuA calculates the
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equivalence class number and sizes correctly. As expected, AQuA always
reported a leakage of 8 bit and a uniform bucketing of the inputs over the 256
equivalence classes. Also, as this code produces a large number of outputs, the
runtime between the two algorithms are roughly equal.
The examples sum3.c and auction.c are taken and adapted from the
paper [4]. The performance of those examples has not been discussed in the
mentioned paper. The auction example is a simple loop where the output is
the highest bidder (variable l) of an auction, however the actual bids (h[i])
are confidential
...
l=0;
for(i=0; i<3; i++) {
if(h[i] > h[l]) l = i;
}
As there are only three outputs almost all time is spent in the model counting
algorithm. The other example sum3.c, and the related sum10.c, is a test to see
how the tool copes with multiple confidential variables, from 3 to 10. Multiple
confidential variables very quickly lead to difficult SAT instances which become
intractable. The value range of 10 values in sum3.c had to be reduced to 6
values and the instance had to be model counted with the C2D backend tool
for it to terminate within reasonable time.
The example search30.c is a loop unrolling test. The code itself is very
short, however due to 30 loop unrollings and self-composition the tool gener-
ated 186 lines of code out of the following code
l=0;
while(l < h) {
l++;
}
However, as the generated code consists mostly of control flow decisions, which
AQuA handles well, the runtime to calculate the leakage of this program is
below 3 seconds.
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Program Σh bits Enumeration Time AQuA x times faster
sum3.c 9.96 12.5s 13x
sum10.c 25.84 ⊥ -
nonlinear.c 13 10m32s 90x
Table 5.2: Runtime comparison to the enumeration tool in Chapter 4
Finally, the example nonlinear.c demonstrates the ability to handle inte-
ger overflows and non-linear arithmetic correctly (due to the bit vector nature
of Spear). The code is the following with the assumption of 16 bit variables
tmp = h * h;
if(tmp < 24) l=0;
else if(tmp > 32) l=1;
else l=2;
Clearly, it only produces three outputs. The interesting aspect however is that
only very few values of h squared will lead to an output of l=2. When run,
AQuA reports the following partition
{292}{65240}{4}
Where the largest equivalence class must be responsible for output 1, the
one with 292 inputs is most likely the one for output 0, and then there is
a class with only 4 inputs where the squared and truncated to 16 bit values
of h should be 25. An enumeration of this equivalence class gives the val-
ues {32763, 5, 32773, 65531}. A simple calculator confirms that all of these
numbers squared and modulo 16 are 25, i.e. the only possible integer square
between 24 and 32.
5.3.1 Comparison to Chapter 4
A direct comparison between the tool performances of the last chapter and
this chapter was not possible. Language restrictions of the previous tool (e.g.
no arrays) would make it difficult to provide all the examples from table 5.1.
However, table 5.2 gives the reader an idea of the performance advantage of
the SAT based tool versus direct enumeration.
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AQuA was 13 times faster than enumeration for program sum3.c. The
program sum10.c did not terminate within 30 minutes; a downscaled version
of nonlinear.c, from 16 to 13 bit secret size, was 90 times faster with AQuA
against enumeration.
5.4 Application: database queries
This section describes how AQuA could be applied to measure leakage of
combined statistical database queries. Database queries are modelled as pro-
grams; our analysis tool calculates the partition of states of that program and
in turn quantifies the leakage of the encoded queries. This section is not about
showcasing the performance of AQuA but to illustrate the potential width of
applications of automatically quantifying leakage.
We will use concepts used by Dobkin et al. [24] to describe databases.
Definition 18. A database D is a function from 1, . . . , n to N. The number
of elements in the database is denoted by n; N is the set of possible attributes.
A database D can also be directly described by its elements {d1, . . . , dn},
with D(i) = di for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For a database with n number of objects, a
query is an n-ary function. Given D, q(D) = q(d1, . . . , dn) is the result of the
query q on the database D.
We assume that a database user can choose the function q and restrict its
application to some of the elements of {d1, . . . , dn}, depending on the query
structure. However, the user can not see any values the function q runs on.
An arbitrary query is translated by the following transformation
Q1 = q(di, . . . , dj) ⇒ l1 = e(hi, . . . hj)
where the function q applied to (di, . . . , dj) is rewritten to some C expression e
3
on the secret variables hi, . . . , hj, where hn is equal to dn for all i ≤ n ≤ j; the
output is stored in the observable variable l1. A sequence of queries Q1, . . . , Qn
3Expressions usually used in statistical database are sum, count, average, mean,
median etc. Our context is general so any C expression could be used
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results in tuples of observable variables (l1, . . . , ln). We denote the partition
of states for a query Qi, after the transformation above, as Π(Qi).
5.4.1 Database inference by examples
To measure the degree of database inferences possible by a sequence of queries
we define the following ratio, comparing leakage with the respective secret
space
Definition 19 (SDB Leakage Ratio). Given an SDB, let Q1, . . . , Qn be queries,
and h1, . . . , hm be the involved secret elements in the database. The percentage
of leakage revealed by the sequence of queries is given by
H(
⊔
1≤i≤nΠ(Qi))
H(h1, . . . , hm)
(5.1)
In the definition we can use definition 14 to compute
⊔
1≤i≤nΠ(Qi)
Max/Sum Example. Two or more queries can lead to an inference prob-
lem when there is an overlap on the query fields. Assume two series of queries:
Q1 = max(h1, h2) Q2 = sum(h3, h4)
The first series of queries ask for the max and sum of two disjoint set of
fields. The two queries don’t share any common secret fields, so Q1 does not
contribute to the leakage of Q2.
Q′1 = max(h1, h2) Q
′
2 = sum(h1, h2)
It is a different picture if the two queries run on the same set of fields, as shown
in Q′1, Q
′
2. Intuitively, we learn the biggest element of the two and we learn the
sum of the two. The queries combined reveal the values of both secret fields,
i.e. sum−max = min.
Assuming 2 bit variables, we get the following calculations:
H(Π(Q1)) = 1.7490 H(Π(Q2)) = 2.6556 H(Π(Q1) unionsq Π(Q2)) = 4.4046
H(Π(Q′1)) = 1.7490 H(Π(Q
′
2)) = 2.6556 H(Π(Q
′
1) unionsq Π(Q′2)) = 3.25
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Contributor Industry Geograph. Area
C1 Steel Northeast
C2 Steel West
C3 Steel South
C4 Sugar Northeast
C5 Sugar Northeast
C6 Sugar West
Table 5.3: Contributors
Contributing Group Amount
Steel h1 + h2 + h3
Sugar h4 + h5 + h6
. . . . . .
Northeast h1 + h4 + h5
. . . . . .
Table 5.4: Summary Table for Contributors
The measure of how much of the secret the two series of queries revealed is the
ratio between the join of the queries to the whole secret space:
H(Π(Q1) unionsq Π(Q2))
H(h1, h2, h3, h4)
=
4.4046
8.0
≈ 55% H(Π(Q
′
1) unionsq Π(Q′2))
H(h1, h2)
=
3.25
4.0
≈ 81%
where we have used H, the Shannon entropy as the leakage measure4. The
3.25 bits, or 81% of the secret, is the maximal possible leakage for the query,
as we still don’t know which of the two secrets secret was the bigger one of
the two, however “everything” is leaked in a sense, while the first query only
reveals 55% of the secret space.
For the enforcement, we could think of a simple monitor which keeps adding
up the information released so far for individual users and which would refuse
certain queries in order to not reveal more than a policy allows. A policy can
be as simple as a percentage of the secret space to be released.
Sum Queries Inference. Consider a database storing donations of con-
tributors to a political party from the steel and sugar industry, contributors
coming from several geographical areas. Given Tables 5.3 and 5.4, a user is
4Taking a different measure like min entropy we would get 40% and 75% respectively
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allowed to make sum queries on all contributors which share a common at-
tribute (Industry or Geographic Area)5. Table 5.4 summarises all possible
queries, where the amount donated by each contributor Ci is represented by
the value hi.
In this scenario, the owner of the databases wants to make sure that no
user can learn more than 50% of the combined secret knowledge of what each
contributor donated.
We will look at two users querying the database; the queries of the first user
fulfill the requirements of the database owner, the second user (who happens
to be contributor C1) is clearly compromising the database information release
requirements.
User 1 is making two queries
Q1 = sum(h1, h2, h3) Q2 = sum(h4, h5, h6)
In other words, User 1 is asking for the sum of the contributors from the steel
and sugar industry. For simplicity, we assume only 2 bit variables for each
contributor hi. AQuA calculates a partition with 100 equivalence classes, and
a Shannon entropy of 5.9685 of total 12 bits.
This results in a ratio of
H(Π(Q1) unionsq Π(Q2))
H(h1, . . . , h6)
=
5.9685
12
≈ 49.73%
which is just within the requirements of 50% information leakage.
User 2, who is contributor C1, is inquiring the following two queries:
Q3 = sum(h4, h5, h6) Q4 = sum(h1, h4, h5)
Here, Q3 and Q4 have an overlap in the fields h4 and h5. Since User 2 is C1,
the field h1 is known, so with these two queries, User 2 is able to learn h6, i.e.
h6 = Q3 − Q4 + h1. The substantial knowledge gain of User 2 is revealed in
5Example adapted from [24]
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the leakage ratio
H(Π(Q3) unionsq Π(Q4))
H(h1, h4, h5, h6)
=
H(Π(Q3) unionsq Π(Q′4))
H(h4, h5, h6)
=
4.6556
6
≈ 77.6%
where in the second equation term h1 in the denominator disappear because
contributor C1 knows h1 (similarly Q
′
4 = sum(h4, h5))
6. If our tool was eval-
uating the information leakage of these queries before the result was reported
back to the user, then Q4 could be denied for User 2.
We can see the previous database as an (easily computable) abstraction of
a real database with a large number of entries. In this case C1 could represent
the set of contributors form the Steel industry in the Northeast. In this case
the leakage ratio would tell us the amount of information the queries leak about
the group of individual (or set of secret data). We can hence extract valuable
information about the threat of a set of queries by automatically computing the
leakage on an abstraction of a database. This measure can be combined with
more classical query restriction techniques like set size and overlap restriction
within a threat monitor. While a precise theory of this monitor is beyond the
scope of this work we believe the ideas are sound and workable.
5.5 Review of technique
This chapter described a push-button static analysis tool called AQuA which
calculates precise partitions on multiple confidential variables generated by C
programs. It is based on a number of different tools and algorithms using SAT
solving and model counting.
This approach addresses a number of deficiencies from the approach in the
previous chapter such as
• possibility of analysing fragments of source code, from whole functions
down to individual lines of code
6To understand the numbers 4.6556 comes by the fact that the queries reveal h6 i.e. 2
bits, plus sum(h4, h5) which is 2.6556 bits
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• avoiding complete enumeration of secret space by the choice of only
counting
– number of equivalence classes
– sizes of equivalence classes
• support for multiple integer confidential variables
• runs on a subset of C instead of a simple while language
AQuA is arguably more scalable than the dynamic approach, as demon-
strated in analysing 700+ lines of generated code or calculating the leakage of
a 60 bit secret space below 17 seconds. However, predicting or bounding the
runtime of this program analysis is hard. Mapping from a set of features of a
problem instance (e.g. the description of a program) to the predicted runtime
is known as empirical hardness modelling [37] where problems as difficult as
the ones built by AQuA are, to the best of our knowledge, not within the
scope of that research area yet.
Still, there are a number of factors involved when evaluating the perfor-
mance and scalability of the tool. The runtime depends on
1. number of lines of code and therefore number of variables and clauses in
the CNF instance
2. number and size of confidential variables
3. arithmetic operations used in the code
4. number of equivalence classes described by the program
All of this basically reduces to how hard the CNF instances are to solve
which is difficult to predict as mentioned above. However, points 3 and 4
deserve further clarification. On point 3: when a program is translated to CNF
a technique called bit-blasting is applied which reduces arithmetic bit-vector
operations to boolean circuits. This can lead to very complex and difficult to
solve circuits for certain operations such as multiplication and modulus. On
point 4: the algorithm to find the number of equivalence classes, P 6=, adds a
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blocking clause for every equivalence class found. The formula grows linearly
with the number of equivalence classes which will slow down the analysis in
case there are a large number of equivalence classes to be found.
5.5.1 Improvements
The algorithms and techniques used to implement AQuA are completely un-
optimised. There are a number of features to add which could easily improve
the performance two-fold or more (obviously still dominated by any exponen-
tial explosion of states). The two most important points are
• Only naive self-composition has been implemented where a full copy of
the program is appended to the original program. More clever composi-
tions could save a lot of unnecessary variables and thus reduce complexity
• Almost all interactions between the different programs are performed
via input-output and parsing instead of direct API calls (mostly because
these APIs don’t exist). Switching to API interactions could dramatically
increase the performance.
83
Chapter 6
Applying Model Checking to
Verify Leakage Policies
So far, we have presented automatic methods to compute the precise informa-
tion leakage in C programs. To reach such precision there is no way around
computing the whole partition of the high values one way or the other. The pre-
vious chapter showed algorithms to perform this calculation in a more scalable
and useful way than just brute-force complete enumeration. Most importantly,
the tool is able to calculate the number of equivalence classes independently
from calculating the sizes of the equivalence classes. This allows to bound the
leakage from above and might give a good indication on the nature of the
leakage – i.e. large leak or small leak. Still, the leakage computation done in
this way will always depend on the secret size; for secret sizes of more than a
few bits this is computationally prohibitive.
In this chapter, we take the idea of bounding the leakage a step further.
Instead of computing the precise leakage, we ask the simpler question “does the
program leak more thanM bits” whereM is a reasonable, externally provided
choice given a larger context. We call such a decision question a quantitative
policy. The crucial insight is that checking a quantitative policy is a k -safety
problem which is bounding the channel capacity based leakage of the program.
Checking whether such a policy holds or is violated allows for a different
style of analysis: the confidential information is modelled as nondeterminism
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and a driver code is provided to each program which asserts the number of
distinctions which are allowed to be observable for the program. This code
is then run by a model checker whose sole purpose is to find a number of
confidential values (drawn from a nondeterministic source) which violate such
a policy.
This chapter largely consists of the successful application of this quantita-
tive leakage analysis on Linux Kernel device driver code. We chose to apply
our method to reported information leakage vulnerabilities in the Linux Kernel
and to common authentication routines. All of the covered vulnerabilities are
indexed by the standardised vulnerability repository CVE from Mitre1. The
vulnerability description are quite detailed because this is the first account of
applying such verification techniques to quantifying real information leakage
bugs, thus it is interesting and important to understand the nature of the leaks.
The drivers can be run by off-the-shelf symbolic model checkers such as
CBMC [17], where this is our choice of verification tool. CBMC is a good choice
for several reasons: (i) it makes it easy to parse and analyse large ANSI-C
based projects (ii) it models bit-vector semantics of C accurately which makes
it able to detect arithmetic overflows amongst others, which turns out to be
important (iii) nondeterministic choice functions are provided to easily model
user input, which also enjoys efficient solving due to the symbolic nature of the
model checker (iv) despite being a bounded model checker, CBMC can check
whether enough unwindings of the transition system were performed which
prove that there are no deeper counterexamples.
Our experiments show that the analysis not only quantifies the leakage but
for certain instances also helps understanding the nature of the leak. In par-
ticular, the counterexample produced by the model checker, when a leakage
property is violated, can provide insights into the cause of the leak. For ex-
ample, we can extract a public user input from the counterexample needed to
trigger a violation.
Another surprising result of our experiment is that in certain circumstances
we were able to use our technique to prove whether the official patches provided
for the vulnerabilities actually eliminate the information leak. This is achieved
1http://cve.mitre.org, CVE is industry-endorsed with over 70 companies actively involved
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by point (iv) from above, when the model checking process is complete.
In summary the main technical contributions of this chapters are the fol-
lowing:
1. We present the first quantitative leakage analysis of operating system
code.
2. We show how to express Quantitative Information Flow properties that
can be efficiently checked using bounded symbolic model checking.
3. We show that the technique not only quantifies leakage in real code but
also provides valuable information about the nature of the leak.
4. In some cases we are able to prove that official patches for reported vul-
nerability do indeed eliminate leakage; these constitute the first positive
proofs of absence of QIF vulnerabilities for real-world systems programs.
This work has been published and presented at the Annual Computer Se-
curity Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2010 with proceedings published by
ACM [30].
6.1 Model of programs and distinctions
A transition system as described in section 3.4.1 is used to model programs.
Again, we are interested in the input/output behaviour of a C function where
inputs are formal arguments to the function and outputs are either return
values or pointer-type arguments. The partition Πl(P ) from equation 3.9 in
section 3.4.1 is used to describe the mapping between confidential inputs and
publicly observable outputs given a low input choice of l.
Formally, we define a quantitative policy as a non-negative natural number
N . A partition Πl(P ) breaches a policy if |Πl(P )| > N , where |Πl(P )| is the
number of equivalence classes of Πl(P ). This number describes the number
of distinct outputs of program P , or equivalently the maximal cardinality for
Πl(P ). We refer to it as the number of distinctions on the secret the program
makes.
86
6.1 MODEL OF PROGRAMS AND DISTINCTIONS
In our model, the question whether a program violates a policy can be
formulated by the following decision question
dΠl(P )e = max
l∈L
|Πl(P )| ≤ N (6.1)
where the verification task is to find a low input l with respect to N where
the cardinality of the resulting partition violates the policy. This search can
be interpreted as a powerful attacker who is able to pick the most damaging
low input l for a given policy N . If there is no such l where Πl(P ) violates the
policy then the program satisfies the policy.
The decision whether a program P satisfies such a policy gives a bound
on the channel capacity. Malacaria and Chen [39] proved that the channel
capacity of P is just log2(dΠl(P )e).
The next section will show the relationship between a channel capacity
based leakage policy and k-safety, as a mean to easily check such policies.
6.1.1 Checking policies and k-safety
Checking a policy for a fixed N distinctions is a k-safety problem. This has
been proved by Yasuoka and Terauchi [66] and previously implied by Malacaria
and Chen [39].
A k-safety property has been formally described by [66] as follows
Definition 20 (k-safety property). A property Q ⊆ Prog × N is a k-safety
property iff (P,N) 6∈ Q implies that there exists T ⊆ [[P ]] with cardinality
|T | ≤ k and ∀P ′.T ⊆ [[P ′]] =⇒ (P ′, N) 6∈ Q.
where in this specific case, the property Q = {(P,N) | dΠl(P )e ≤ N}.
Informally, the definition can be understood in the following way: a de-
cision can be made if a program satisfies the property or not by observing a
counterexample T ⊆ [[P ]] with size |T | ≤ k. Also, for all other programs where
T is also a valid trace, they are all not satisfying the property either. Since we
consider input/output semantics, |T | is the number of runs necessary to refute
the property.
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In our case, if a program and natural number N is not in the property,
(P,N) 6∈ Q, means that it is possible to count N + 1 distinct input/output
pairs in some trace T . This makes the policy check a N + 1-safety check [66].
Thus, our property states that every program contained in the property
does not make more than N distinctions on the output. As this coincides
with the channel capacity measure the outcome of the check has the following
quantitative implication
Also notice that “verified” in the following proposition assumes a complete
analysis.
Proposition 11. For a program P , maximising low choice l, and policy N , if
equation 6.1 is
• verified then log2(N) is an upper bound
• violated then log2(N + 1) is a lower bound
on the channel capacity of the program P .
Proof. Immediate through the channel capacity result in equation 2.2 and from
definition 20.
The next section will use the fact that every k-safety problem can be re-
duced to a normal safety problem using self-composition as a way to encode
policies in a driver function.
6.2 Encoding distinction-based policies
A program violates a quantitative policy if it makes more distinctions than
what is allowed in the policy. A leaking program is one breaching the policy
N = 1 in the above definition.
We take ideas from assume-guarantee reasoning [52] to encode such a pol-
icy in a driver function, which tries to trigger a violation, i.e. producing a
counterexample, of the policy. If the policy states that the function func is
not allowed to make more than 2 distinctions then this is modelled as shown in
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int h1,h2,h3;
int o1,o2,o3;
h1 = input(); h2 = input(); h3 = input();
o1 = func(h1);
o2 = func(h2);
assume(o1 != o2); // (A)
o3 = func(h3);
assert(o3 == o1 || o3 == o2); // (B)
Program 1: Example driver checking for 2 distinctions
Program 1. This driver only has a high component as a state, which is passed
to the function func where the policy is tested on.
Drivers always have a similar structure: we model the secret by a nonde-
terministic choice function input() as a placeholder for all possible values of
that type; then for a policy of checking for N distinctions, the function under
inspection is called N times. The crucial step (A) is the use of the assume
statement after the calls: the driver assumes that, in this case, there are two
different return values found already. The function is called an N + 1th time
and at (B) the driver asserts that the next output is either one of the previously
found outputs.
The assume statement only considers execution paths which satisfy the
given boolean formula, all other paths are rejected. Further, the bounded
model checker used will try to find a counterexample to the negated assertion
claim, which is only satisfiable if and only if a counterexample exists. An
unsatisfiable formula means that the original claim holds, i.e. the program
conforms to the policy. The verification condition generated by the bounded
model checker for the policy in Program 1 is:
o1 != o2 =⇒ (o3 == o1 || o3 == o2)
Where the bounded model checker tries to find a counterexample (execution
path) using the negated claim such that the following holds
o1 != o2 ∧ o3 != o1 ∧ o3 != o2
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Input: Function func, types t,t’,t”, comparison eq t, bound k, threshold
N
Output: Driver.c
t o_1, . . ., o_n, o_n+1;
t’ h_1, . . ., h_n, h_n+1;
t’’ l;
h_1 = input(); . . . h_n = input(); h_n+1 = input();
l = input();
o_1 = func(h_1, l);
...
o_n = func(h_n, l);
assume(!eq_t(o_1, o_2) && !eq_t(o_1, o_3) && . . .);
o_n+1 = func(h_n+1, l);
assert(eq_t(o_n+1, o_1) || eq_t(o_n+1, o_2) || . . .);
Algorithm 4: Template to syntactically generate a driver for an N
distinction policy
i.e. that there are three distinctions possible.
Another possibility is that the function func does not even make two dis-
tinctions, such that the assume statement at point (A) is always false, which
leads to proving the policy (or any policy) vacuously true, because for any
assertion Q the verification condition is true, i.e. false =⇒ Q.
6.2.1 Bounded model checking
We use the bounded model checker CBMC to verify or falsify a policy. CBMC
encodes an ANSI-C program into a propositional formula by unwinding the
transition relation and user defined specifications up to some bound. This for-
mula is only satisfiable if there exists an error trace violating the specification.
The tool can also check if the unwinding bound is sufficient by introducing
unwinding assertions, which are assertions on the negated loop guards. This
ensures that no longer counterexample can exist than the used bound. To
prove any properties the analysis has to pass unwinding assertions, otherwise
it can only be used as a way to find counterexamples up to the unwinding
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bound.
The C program gets encoded into constraints C and the property – user
defined assertions – are encoded in P . Then the model checker tries to find a
satisfiable assignment to the formula
C ∧ ¬P
where P is an accumulation of the assumptions and assertions made in the
program text. Thus if there are two assume statements in the driver with
expressions E1 and E2 and one assert statement with expression Q then P is
P ≡ E1 ∧ E2 =⇒ Q.
6.2.2 Driver
A general template for a driver is described in Algorithm 4. The inputs to the
algorithm are the function func to be analysed, possibly up to three different
types for the input/output pair 〈(h, l), o〉, and a comparison function eq t
which returns true if the arguments of type t are equal, where t is the type
of the observation of function func. This comparison function could be as
simple as == of C, or a more complex function, such as memcmp, if t is an array
or string. Also note that the observations o i do not need to be only return
values, but can also be variables passed by reference to func.
Proposition 12 (Correctness of driver template). If the driver template in
Algorithm 4 is successfully verified up to a bound k (i.e. the negated claim is
unsatisfiable) then the function func does not make more than N distinctions
on the output within the bound k. Formally, we state that the correctness
of the driver implies the correctness of the policy specified. We prove this
by showing that the structure of the driver encodes a limit on the maximum
possible distinctions made by the function func.
o1 6= o2 ∧ o1 6= o3 ∧ · · · ∧ on−1 6= on
=⇒ on+1 = o1 ∨ · · · ∨ on+1 = on
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Proof. We prove the proposition by showing that the triple assume(E); S;
assert(Q) generates the above implication through weakest precondition se-
mantics on the structure of the driver:
wp(assume(E);S,Q)
wp(assume(E), wp(S,Q))
E =⇒ wp(S,Q)
with S ≡ on+1 = func(hn+1, l), Q ≡ on+1 = o1∨· · ·∨on+1 = on, and E ≡ o1 6=
o2 ∧ o1 6= o3 ∧ · · · ∧ on−1 6= on we get by substitution:
E =⇒ Q[func(hn+1, l)/on+1]
o1 6= o2 ∧ o1 6= o3 ∧ · · · ∧ on−1 6= on =⇒ func(hn+1, l) = o1 ∨ · · · ∨ func(hn+1, l) = on
Thus, we can make the following claims on the result of the model checking
process: For a given bound k and a policy,
• if the model checker finds a counterexample then the policy is violated,
i.e. the program makes more distinctions than specified.
• if the process ends with a successful verification of the policy without
unwinding assertions then the policy holds up to an unwinding of k.
This result is complete up to bound k.
• if the process ends with a successful verification of the policy with un-
winding assertions then the policy holds for any number of iterations.
This result is complete.
6.3 Checking policies in practice
The steps in checking a program or function for the compliance with a quan-
titative policy are as follows:
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1. Define the input state (h, l) and output state o in the code, i.e. the
confidential input h, the low input l, and the observation o
2. Define the maximum number of distinctions allowed by the policy and
an unwinding factor k
3. Generate a driver function using the template in Algorithm 4
4. Run CBMC on the driver. If the driver is successfully verified, poten-
tially increase the unwinding factor or add the unwinding assertion
6.3.1 Modelling low input
A crucial aspect of the analysis is to model low user input, which is often
responsible for triggering a bug which causes the information leak. These
bugs only happen on a very restricted number of execution paths and could
be exploited by a malicious user choosing a special user input. This scenario
generally applies when studying many CVE reported information leakage vul-
nerabilities.
Let us look at the following simplified code in Program 2, which contains
an integer underflow, taken from the vulnerability CVE-2007-2875 in the linux
kernel.
At first, it seems not possible that the point (C) where the secret h gets
returned is ever executed; exactly that check is done in (A) which reduces
the variable nbytes to be within the bound bufsz. However, due to wrong
choice and combination of types, the subtraction in (B) causes an underflow
in nbytes for a very large ppos value. Unfortunately, ppos is a user controlled
input variable, such that when its value is chosen carefully, point (C) is reached.
In this example, a state in the system is the tuple (h, l) which represents
the arguments to the function underflow, i.e. the formal parameters h and
ppos; observations are the return values of this function. The generated driver
can automatically find the low part of a state which triggers such subsequent
information leaks, because the analysis instructs the model checker to find
any possible execution path satisfying the assumptions and assertions on the
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typedef long long loff_t;
typedef unsigned int size_t;
int underflow(int h, loff_t ppos) {
int bufsz;
size_t nbytes;
bufsz=1024;
nbytes=20;
if (ppos + nbytes > bufsz) // (A)
nbytes = bufsz - ppos; // (B)
if(ppos + nbytes > bufsz) {
return h; // (C)
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Program 2: Integer underflow causing a leak
outputs, given nondeterministic high values and fixed low inputs. As SAT-
based model checking is precise down to the individual bit, it will find a low
input which triggers the underflow and uncovers the leak.
CBMC generates a counterexample falsifying a policy of e.g. no leakage
and thereby having triggered the integer underflow. The following excerpt of
the counterexample
State 14 file underflow.c line 40 function main
----------------------------------------------------
underflow::main::1::l=1706688912 (00000000...
....
State 35 file underflow.c line 13 function underflow
----------------------------------------------------
underflow::underflow::1::nbytes=4027596816 (11110000...
shows that a low input of l=1706688912 lead to an nbytes which underflowed
from the previous value 20.
Clearly, for such leaks to be detected it needs bit-level precise reasoning,
just like SAT-based bounded model checkers support.
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6.3.2 Modelling environments
In model checking, the environment, such as library function calls or generally
functions and data structures which have no implementation, need to be mod-
elled in a way which allows for the property to be verified. Out of the box,
CBMC replaces function calls without implementation with nondeterministic
values.
As our analysis needs to check for equality on inputs and outputs of func-
tions a certain number of common library functions have to be modelled in a
way which preserves their original semantics. For example, the usual library
C functions memcmp, and strcmp are implemented in a way which return 0 if
their arguments are equal and a value not equal to 0 if they are not equal. The
functions memset and memcpy actually set an array of integers or characters to
a certain value or to the content of another array. The same applies to linux
kernel utility functions such as copy to user and copy from user which copy
memory blocks to or from user space.
For example, a memcmp implementation is shown in Program 3.
int memcmp(void *s1, void *s2, unsigned int n) {
int i;
char *us1,*us2;
us1 = (char*) s1;
us2 = (char*) s2;
for(i=0;i<n;i++) {
if(us1[i] != us2[i]) return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Program 3: Simplified memcmp model
These library functions do not have to follow the exact semantics of their
original implementation but merely have to be precise enough to represent the
necessary distinctions on the confidential variables. For example, the given
memcmp only returns the values 0 and -1 while the original libc function has
more complex return values. However, those return values are not needed for
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the purposes of the analysis as the only condition we rely upon is that if the
function returns 0 then all characters in both strings s1 and s2 are equal. How
to write these models needs understanding of the code which the analysis will
be run on.
A properly modelled environment contains all of the following points
• All types, type definitions, and preprocessor constants are provided
• Models for all library functions are provided
• All pointers referring to global structures have been initialised
• The confidential variables or structures have been assigned nondetermin-
istic values
It is clear that this involves a significant amount of manual effort to provide
a good environment. However, to put the effort in perspective, if there is a
large amount of work necessary to provide an environment then it can most
likely be reused for analysing different functions in the code base; if the code
to be analysed is small then the work to provide the model is small.
6.3.3 Modelling confidential values
The big advantage and difference between checking and inferring quantitative
information flow is that checking is independent of the range of confidential
values and solely depends on the number of distinctions which need to be
checked. Thus, it does not matter whether the confidential variable contains
1024 bits or 100 megabytes as long as the source the values are drawn from
allows for enough distinct values to violate the property. Confidential variables
are modelled using nondeterministic choice functions which are provided by
CBMC. Every primitive type has its own function returning nondeterministic
values, such as nondet int(), nondet char(), etc.
The simplest, runnable driver is shown in Program 4. The driver encodes
a policy of 2 distinctions and the function f returns nondeterministic integers
between 0 and 1 where the variable tmp implicitly models the confidential
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int f() {
int tmp = nondet_int() % 2;
__CPROVER_assume(tmp >= 0);
return tmp;
}
int main() {
int o1,o2,o3;
o1 = f();
o2 = f();
__CPROVER_assume(o1 != o2);
o3 = f();
assert(o3 == o1 || o3 == o2);
}
Program 4: Simple implementation of template in Algorithm 4
values. The function f satisfies the policy as long as it does not produce more
confidential values than the drivers checks for.
For more complex types (structures) allocation functions have to be pro-
vided to nondeterministically initialise all of the fields of the types. An example
allocation function used in one of the linux kernel experiments is the one in
Program 5.
6.4 Experimental results
We applied our technique to CVE reported information leakage vulnerabilities
in the Linux Kernel. In the experiments we checked for policy violations and
proved whether official patches resolve the information leakage. Notice that
proving the absence of information leakage could also be done by a noninter-
ference check, which is the special case of a policy N = 1. We also analysed
authentication routines of the Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP) and
of a Internet Message Support Protocol implementation. A summary of the
results is shown in Table 6.1. The leakage is reported in the second last column
where > log2(N) means that more than log2(N) bits leaked, i.e. the policy N
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struct sockaddr_at* alloc_sockaddr_at() {
int i;
struct sockaddr_at* tmp = (struct sockaddr_at*)
malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_at));
for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
tmp->sat_zero[i] = nondet_char();
}
tmp->sat_len = nondet_uchar();
tmp->sat_family = nondet_uchar();
tmp->sat_port = nondet_uchar();
return tmp;
}
Program 5: Allocation function for a sockaddr at type
Description CVE Bulletin LOC k? Patch Proof log2(N) Time
AppleTalk CVE-2009-3002 237 64 X >6 bit 1h39m
tcf fill node CVE-2009-3612 146 64 X >6 bit 3m34s
sigaltstack CVE-2009-2847 199 128 X >7 bit 49m50s
cpuset† CVE-2007-2875 63 64 × >6 bit 1m32s
SRP getpass – 93 8 X ≤1 bit 0.128s
login unix – 128 8 – ≤2 bit 8.364s
Table 6.1: Experimental Results. ? Number of unwindings † From Section
6.3.1
has been violated; equally, ≤ log2(N) means the policy N has been verified.
These two cases correspond to lower and upper bounds on the leakage.
6.4.1 Linux kernel
We define information leakage in the kernel always as parts of the kernel mem-
ory which gets mistakenly copied to user space, i.e. the virtual memory al-
located to conventional applications. Clearly, this should not happen as any-
thing allocated in the kernel space is not meant to be seen by users (except
within the bounds of normal user/kernel interactions), especially in multi-user
systems like Linux. Thus, in all examples the kernel memory is modelled as
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nondeterministic values.
The interface between user and kernel space are system calls or syscalls
in short. Syscalls, like normal functions, have a number of arguments and a
return value where the kernel can transfer data structures or single values back
and forth. This is the crucial point in the system where information leakage
is most common.
AppleTalk. The specific vulnerability CVE-2009-3002 in the appletalk
network code shows a quite common cause of information leakage: a user
requests, by a syscall, that a structure gets filled with values and returned to
user land. The developer however forgot to assign values to all fields in the
struct, thus these missing fields get “filled” with unspecified kernel memory, as
it is allocated on the stack. This CVE security bulletin actually comprises six
different vulnerable network protocol implementations, all following the same
leakage pattern, probably as result of copy&paste programming. We will only
present the affected code of the AppleTalk implementation – the same kind of
analysis applies to all six vulnerabilities.
In this case the structure returned to the user, thus the observable, is shown
in Program 6. The leaking function is atalk getname in net/appletalk/ddp.c
struct sockaddr_at {
u_char sat_len, sat_family, sat_port;
struct at_addr sat_addr;
union {
struct netrange r_netrange;
char r_zero[8];
} sat_range;
};
#define sat_zero sat_range.r_zero
Program 6: Complex observation struct leads to leak from sat zero.
is shown in Program 7.
In that function, the structure sat gets filled with values provided by the
kernel, at the end the whole structure is copied via memcpy to the address of
the uaddr pointer, which is, indirectly via the syscall getsockname, copied
back to user land. However, the field sat.sat zero has not been initialised,
99
6.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
int atalk_getname(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *uaddr, int *uaddr_len, int peer) {
struct sockaddr_at sat;
// Official Patch. Comment out to trigger leak
//memset(&sat.sat_zero, 0, sizeof(sat.sat_zero));
... // sat structure gets filled
memcpy(uaddr, &sat, sizeof(sat));
return 0;
}
Program 7: Function introducing the leak for CVE-2009-3002.
thus a number of bytes of kernel memory are not overwritten and get copied
back to the user.
The secret is implicitly modelled by allocating the sat structure with non-
deterministic values; observations are also of type sockaddr at. The driver
uses as parameter eq t the library function memcmp to compare memories.
Running the model checker on this driver for a 6 bit policy generated a
counterexample within 1 hour and 39 minutes. Once the official patch was
applied which sets the sat structure to 0 with memset, our driver successfully
verified the policy in about the same time with unwinding assertions, thus it
proved that the patch stops the leak.
tcf fill node. This information leak occurs in the netlink subsystem
of the kernel. In Program 8, the function tcf fill node prepares a struct
tcmsg to be sent back to the user. However, the programmer made a typing
mistake and assigned the field tcm pad1 twice instead of assigning tcm pad2
the second time.
This leaks kernel memory from tcm pad2 back to user space. Here, we
again modelled kernel memory implicitly by the memory allocated for tcm
through the function NLMSG DATA, which initialised the fields of the struct with
nondeterministic values. The observation is the filled out variable tcm, the low
user input is a simple integer variable not mentioned here for clarity.
The official patch which was applied to fix the leak is simply changing the
last line of Program 8 to tcm->tcm pad2=0. We were again able to prove
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struct tcmsg *tcm;
...
nlh=NLMSG_NEW(skb, pid, seq, event, sizeof(*tcm), flags);
tcm=NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
tcm->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC;
tcm->tcm__pad1 = 0;
tcm->tcm__pad1 = 0; // typo, should be tcm__pad2 instead.
Program 8: Function excerpt introducing the leak for CVE-2009-3612.
that this patch successfully fixes the security hole and with out it the program
violates a leakage policy of 6 bits.
Without the patch, a counterexample is found within 3 minutes and 34
seconds; with the patch, the program is verified within the same time.
sigaltstack. The leakage for this vulnerability is intricate and only
manifests itself on 64-bit processors. On such a system, the struct stack t,
as shown in Program 9, will be padded to a multiple of 8 bytes because on
64-bit systems void* and size t are both 8 bytes (instead of 4 bytes for 32-bit
systems), while an integer type remains 4 bytes. Thus, the size of stack t is
padded to 24 bytes, while on a 32-bit system it remains unpadded at 12 bytes.
typedef struct sigaltstack {
void __user *ss_sp;
int ss_flags; // 4 bytes padding on 64-bit
size_t ss_size;
} stack_t;
Program 9: Structure with padding depending on architecture.
The syscall do sigaltstack in kernel/signal.c copies such a structure
back to userland via the copy function copy to user, however it does not clear
the padding bytes, thus those are leaked to the user on a 64-bit system. In
the function visible in Program 10, the high input is the structure oss and the
low output is the argument uoss.
CBMC supports modelling of 64-bit widths however that is not enough to
automatically measure the padding bytes. This is because the sizeof operator
in CBMC returns only the sum of all sizes without eventual bit alignments.
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int do_sigaltstack (const stack_t __user *uss,
stack_t __user *uoss, unsigned long sp) {
stack_t oss;
... // oss fields get filled
if (copy_to_user(uoss, &oss, sizeof(oss)))
goto out; ....
Program 10: Leakage through copying whole structures including padding.
This is solved in our approach by providing a model of the copy to user
function, just like e.g. an implementation of memcpy is provided, which checks
if the length parameter is aligned according to the architecture (4 bytes for
32 and 8 bytes for 64). If there are padding alignments then these will be
chosen to be filled with nondeterministic integer values modulo the number of
padding bytes.
In Program 10, this would translate to the following: sizeof(oss) counts
20 bytes as the size of the structure. However, this does not account for the
padding bytes, and our copy to user model does the following calculation:
pad = ALIGN - (sizeof(oss) % ALIGN);
if(pad == ALIGN)
padding = 0;
else
padding = ((unsigned int) nondet_int()) % (1 << (pad*8))
where ALIGN is chosen to be 4 or 8 depending on the architecture used. In
a 64-bit system, this translates to 8 − (20%8) = 4 bytes for pad which are
represented by the padding variable.
With this setup, we were able to verify that on a 32-bit system the Program
10 does not leak anything, while on a 64-bit system this violates a policy of e.g.
7 bits. A counterexample was found within 49 minutes and 50 seconds. We
were also able to prove that the official patch removes the padding leak. The
patch in this case was not to copy the whole struct but copying the three struct
members separately through the function put user, where the padding does
not come into play.
cpuset. The crucial part of this vulnerability has already been discussed
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in Section 6.3.1. Our analysis finds the right low input which triggers the
integer underflow. The actual code however does not simply return the secret
as shown in the section mentioned above, but it copies nbytes number of bytes
from a buffer ctr->buf at offset *ppos. Because of the underflow, nbytes and
if (*ppos + nbytes > ctr->bufsz)
nbytes = ctr->bufsz - *ppos;
if (copy_to_user(buf, ctr->buf + *ppos, nbytes))
return -EFAULT;
*ppos access memory way out of the actual buffer and thus disclose kernel
memory. However our analysis of this vulnerability requires at the moment
too much manual intervention to model memory access outside of the allowed
bound ( i.e. ctr->buf + *ppos).
One elegant way of addressing this problem would be by modifying CBMC
itself; CBMC could for example return nondeterministic values for such out-of-
bound memory accesses which would implicitly model the access to confidential
data.
6.4.2 Authentication checks
We analysed parts of the authentication routines of the secure remote password
suite (SRP) and the Unix password authentication of Cyrus’ Internet Message
Support Protocol daemon (IMSPD).
SRP. To demonstrate that confidential variables and observations can
be used flexibly, we checked that there is no leakage in the password request
function in libsrp/t getpass.c.
The confidential input is the password entered by the user when being
prompted at the login; the observations are the echos of the terminal of typed
characters. Whether the terminal echos the typed characters or not depends
on which mode the console is in. The environment modelling the console and
its modes had to be provided to check this program.
In Program 11, the function t getpass first gets the current mode of the
console by the function GetConsoleMode; then it sets a new console mode by
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_TYPE( int ) t_getpass (char* buf, unsigned maxlen,
const char* prompt) {
DWORD mode;
GetConsoleMode( handle, &mode );
SetConsoleMode( handle, mode & ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT );
if(fputs(prompt, stdout) == EOF ||
fgets(buf, maxlen, stdin) == NULL) {
SetConsoleMode(handle,mode);
return -1;
} ....
Program 11: Side-effect of mode decides on echo output of fgets
inverting the bit
ENABLE ECHO INPUT in the mode through the function
SetConsoleMode which clearly disables the echo of input read from standard
input. The function GetConsoleMode is modelled by nondeterministically set-
ting the mode to any integer value, the function SetConsoleMode sets a global
mode variable to its second argument. The function fgets, which reads a
number of bytes from stdin, is modelled to return its first argument buf
completely if the mode is set to echo the input and return a constant value
otherwise.
With this setup CBMC proves through our driver that starting from any
initial mode, the program will always end up with log2(| 'P |) = 0, i.e. that
there is no leakage. We can also successfully check that if the line which
disables the echo is removed then the policy is violated.
IMSPD. The function checked in this package is login plaintext in
imsp/login unix.c, as shown in Program 12.
The program first tries to receive the stored password context of a user using
the function getpwnam. If successful, it will compare the stored with the en-
tered password using strcmp. If this fails it will set the string reply to “wrong
password”. If authentication is successful it returns 0.
Clearly, this function has three distinguishable observables: (1) it returns
1 (2) it returns 1 and sets *reply (3) it returns 0. We modelled the three
parameters to the function as low user input and the stored password as con-
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int login_plaintext(char *user, char* pass,
char** reply) {
...
struct passwd* pwd = getpwnam(user);
if (!pwd) return 1;
if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd,
crypt(pass, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
*reply = "wrong password";
return 1;
}
return 0;
Program 12: Login function of IMSPD.
fidential variable. With this setup, we were able to verify, within 9 seconds,
that this program conforms to a policy which only allows 3 distinctions on the
confidential variable.
6.5 Review of technique
This chapter presented a way to check if an ANSI-C program conforms to a
quantitative policy. The checking of a policy is effectively the checking of a k-
safety problem where the outcome describes a bound on the worst case leakage
(channel capacity).
The biggest advantage of just checking quantitative information flow in-
stead of inferring it precisely is that the analysis is independent of the secret
size. The secret is modelled by nondeterministic choice functions which could
be seen as pool of values within the range of the secret. This pool only needs
to be large enough to draw as many values from it as necessary to falsify a
policy – the real size of the secret is unimportant. This made it possible to
run the analysis on data structures which are too large for enumeration or on
structures which represent unbounded memory.
A disadvantage of this approach is that it needs manual intervention and
modelling effort for each code base under analysis. Writing functions and li-
brary calls to model the environment is unavoidable. However, other manual
work involved like writing allocation and nondeterministic functions for confi-
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dential data structures could probably be avoided by extending CBMC.
6.5.1 Improvements
Extending CBMC
There are two parts in the whole process which need manual work: one is the
environment generation, the other one is allocating the confidential structures
with nondeterministic values. The latter one could probably be completely
automated by extending CBMC or by a preprocessing step. The working
of the allocation functions are completely mechanical: take all types in the
structure and assign them values from the respective nondet * functions.
This would further simplify the amount of effort necessary to check a certain
module for leakage.
Driver structure
To increase scalability, the function calls before the assume statement could
be replaced by an abstraction. This is easily possible because of the assume-
guarantee structure of the driver. For example, a simplified driver with N = 2
could be written as
o1 = f octagon();
o2 = f octagon();
assume(o1 != o2);
o3 = f();
assert(o3 == o1 || o3 == o2);
where f octagon is a function returning a concrete value chosen nondetermin-
istically from an octagonal abstract domain generated by abstractly interpret-
ing f. This would drastically reduce the size and complexity of the boolean
formula generated by CBMC without compromising soundness. However, this
will introduce spurious violations of a policy which would need refinement.
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Related Work
7.1 QIF tools
7.1.1 Model checking & constraint solving
Recently, Backes, Ko¨pf, and Rybalchenko published an elegant method to
calculate and quantify an equivalence relation given a C-like program [4].
Two algorithms are described to discover and quantify the required equiva-
lence relation. The procedure Disco starts with an equivalence relation equiv-
alent to the ⊥ element in the lattice of information, and iteratively discovers
and refines the relation by discovering pairs of execution paths which do lead
to a distinction in the outputs. The corresponding high inputs of those two
paths are then split in two different equivalence classes. This process is re-
peated until no more counter examples are discovered. The procedure Quant
calculates the sizes of equivalence classes generated by the output of the pre-
vious procedure. The result can be normalised to a probability distribution
and any probabilistic measure can be applied on it.
Disco is implemented by turning the information flow checking into a reach-
ability problem, as shown by [59]. The program P is self-composed by creating
a copy of the code P ′ with disjoint variable sets (indicated by the primes) and
an added low inequality check at the end of the newly created program, where
R is the relation to be refined:
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if(l = l’ && (h,h’) in R)
P(h,l)
P’(h’,l’)
if(l != l’)
error
If the error state is reachable then that indicates that there exist two paths of
the program P with related low and high inputs which produce distinguishable
outputs l and l′. This is a violation of the noninterference property and thus
a leak of information.
The model checker Armc is applied to this reachability problem which
will output a path to the error label, if reachable. Beside the path, the model
checker also returns a formula in linear arithmetic which characterises all initial
states from which the error state is reachable. Out of this formula, the two
previously related secrets h and h′ can be extracted which are then split in
two different equivalence classes.
Given the formula from the last step, Quant calculates the number and
sizes of those equivalence classes using a combination of the Omega calculator
and the Lattice Point Enumeration Tool. Omega calculates for each equiv-
alence class a linear arithmetic proposition in disjunctive normal form. The
enumeration tool then solves these system of linear inequalities for each class,
which results in counting the number of elements in the equivalence class.
The so generated equivalence class can then be applied to various entropy
formulas. The paper shows as example, among others, a sum query of three
secrets. The precision and scalability of the tool entirely depends on the choice
of underlying tools. The runtime depends on the number of execution paths
of the program under analysis and number of variables involved.
7.1.2 Interval abstraction
Mu and Clark use probabilistic semantics in an abstract interpretation frame-
work to build an automatic analyser [50]. The authors borrow Kozen’s seman-
tics for probabilistic programs which interprets programs as a partial measur-
able functions on a measurable space; these semantics can be seen as a way
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to map an input probability distribution to an output probability distribution
through the execution of the program under analysis. The entropy measure
used is Shannon’s entropy was extended to work on “incomplete” random
variables, where the entropy is normalised to the coverage of the probability
distribution.
To make their analysis tractable, they employ abstract interpretation as
their abstraction technique. The interval abstract domain is used to partition
the concrete measure space into blocks. Additionally, Monniaux’s abstract
probabilistic semantics are used to replace the previous concrete semantics.
The abstraction overestimates the leakage through uniformalization, which
provides safe upper bounds on the leakage. The concrete space X is abstracted
to a set of interval-based partitions for each program variable, together with
a weighting factor αi, which is the sum of the probabilities of the interval
value-range.
The abstract domain is described by a Galois connectionX〈α, γ〉X#, where
the measure space X is abstracted by X#. The abstraction function α is a
map from X to sets of interval-based partitions X# = {〈αi, [Ei]〉}0<i≤n, with
n the number of partitions, αi the weight, [Ei] be the interval based partition
of X. The concretisation function γ maps X# to
⋃{x|x ∈ [Ei/η]}, where Ei
is a block of the abstract object X# and η is a sub-partition on each block
under uniform distribution.
The corresponding abstract semantics function [[·]]# transforms the abstract
spaces described byX#. The description of the abstract operations are skipped
and instead we explain the effects of a conditional on the abstract domain as
an example: the test splits the abstract space into two parts according to the
two outcomes of the test. The if statement returns the sum of the statements
in the two branches where the new intervals of variable values are calculated
using interval arithmetic.
Taking an example from the authors paper
if(x==0) then y=0 else y=1
The analysis starts off with an initial probability distribution for x as 3 bit
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variable (
0→ 0.1 1→ 0.1 2→ 0.1 3→ 0.1
4→ 0.2 5→ 0.2 6→ 0.1 7→ 0.1
)
and y as low security variable under any distribution. An initial partition is
then for example
E1〈[0, 3]x, [0, 7]y〉 α1 = 0.4
E2〈[4, 7]x, [0, 7]y〉 α2 = 0.6
After applying the abstract operation for the if statement the abstract domain
is transformed to
E ′1〈[0, 3]x, [0, 1]y〉 α′1 = 0.4
E ′2〈[4, 7]x, [1, 1]y〉 α′2 = 0.6
The working of the interval-arithmetic is clearly visible in the restriction of the
intervals for the y variable.
Leakage of loops is done in a standard fashion using least fixpoints and
interval widening, additionally the weight on each abstract element is the max-
imum between the current and previous iteration.
Once the final abstract space has been calculated, the uniformalization
transformation guarantees a conservative leakage analysis; this is a process to
maximise the entropy for a given abstract space. Again, let us explain this
using an example. After some computation, we are given the abstract object
on the left; the uniformalized probability distribution on variable l is given on
the right.
E ′1〈[2, 2]y〉 α′1 = 0.3
E ′2〈[3, 3]y〉 α′2 = 0.4
E ′3〈[4, 6]y〉 α′2 = 0.3
,

2 → 0.3/1
3 → 0.4/1
4 → 0.3/3
5 → 0.3/3
6 → 0.3/3

Thus, the weight of each interval is divided by the size of the interval. Finally,
the leakage upper bound of this space is calculated as H(0.3, 0.4, 0.3) + 0.3 ∗
log(3).
This work is the first description of an abstract domain for quantitative in-
formation flow. The precision of the analysis is clearly limited by the precision
of the interval arithmetic and uniformalization. The scalability of the analysis
has not been discussed by the authors.
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7.1.3 Network flow capacity & dynamic analysis
McCamant and Ernst [45, 46] present multiple techniques to analyse infor-
mation leakage in large C, C++, and Objective C programs. The authors
released as tool Flowcheck which computes leakage as the maximum flow
between inputs and outputs using a combination of network flow capacities
and dynamic binary analysis. The basic tool to model programs is a network
flow graph which represents the execution of a program in a form similar to
a circuit. Edges represent values, and have their secret bitwidths (how many
secret bits that can be transferred by that edge) as capacity. Nodes represent
basic operations on those values. Implicit flows, generated by branches and
pointers, are integrated in this model through what the authors call enclosed
region. Such a region is an annotation in the code which abstracts away a
block of the program into a single node with given inputs and outputs. Those
annotations can be partly inferred and some need manual editing of the source
code. The calculation of leakage then reduces to checking the maximum flow
in this network.
The tool was applied to a number of large programs, such as the OpenSSH
client, and X server, and the Imagemagick tool. Their approach is interesting
as it is not based on reachability, like most other analyses, and because it
reaches a high level of scalability through making use of dynamic instrumen-
tation tools, such as Valgrind.
7.1.4 Sampling channel capacity
Chatzikokolakis, Chothia, and Guha [10] automatically quantify information
flows using a statistical approach which treats probabilistic systems as black-
boxes; thus it is not a language-based analysis. Such a blackbox-approach has
the advantage that any system, even applications which the attacker has no
direct access to, could be analysed for leakage as long as repeated inputs and
outputs of the system can be observed.
Once inputs and outputs have been defined, the system is sampled on a
number of inputs. The aim is to build a probability transition matrix which
reflects the true conditional probabilities of the outputs given the inputs. Given
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this estimated matrix, the capacity, i.e. mutual information, of the system is
calculated.
The capacity is automatically calculated using an iterative algorithm, which
is a more efficient and more automated approach than previously described in
the quantitative information flow literature [39].
However, the leakage quantity calculated in this way is the result of an
approximation algorithm on a sampled matrix, thus it needs further statistical
analysis to gain confidence in the numbers. The authors provide a way to
calculate bounds on the true capacity given the estimated result.
The implemented tool is applied to a Mixminion remailer which provides
anonymous email forwarding. The goal of the analysis was to check how well
the remailer retains the anonymity of the sender. For example one of the
tests ran was to check if the ordering of packets entering and leaving the node
leaks information about the identity of the sender. The authors were able to
show that the estimate is within the bounds of zero leakage, i.e. no loss of
anonymity.
7.2 QIF theory
This section cites papers which introduced influential ideas used in this thesis.
Lattice of information. Landauer and Redmond wrote the original lattice
of information paper [35]. Knuth’s paper gave me the idea to look into lat-
tice valuations in relation to information theory [32]. Nakamura provided the
proofs and crucial insights connecting semivaluations and entropy [51]. The
papers by Schellekens [53] and Simovici [56] also described similar ideas on
entropy and the lattice of partitions. Zdancewic and Myers used the lattice
of information in an information flow setting where it was used as model to
describe what is distinguishable for an observer [68].
Self-composition. Barthe et al. first described secure information flow
by self-composition [5]. In the same paper, the authors also describe non-
interference in terms of Computation Tree Logic which could be in itself an
interesting research direction.
Terauchi and Aiken extended this work and introduced the idea of secure
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information flow being a 2-safety problem [59]. Both papers mention how self-
composition lends itself to using model checkers for verifying secure information
flows in programs.
K-safety. The concept of k-safety has been introduced by Clarkson and
Schneider’s Hyperproperties [16] and the two very influential papers on quan-
titative information flow by Yasuoka and Terauchi [65, 66]. The latter two
papers study the verification hardness of exactly quantifying and bounding
information leakage. The second paper proves a theorem which shows that for
a fixed number of distinctions, calculating a bound on the channel capacity
is a k-safety problem. While we independently found and described the same
result, the theoretical presentation is clearer in Yasuoka and Terauchi’s paper
and deserves special mention.
Counterexamples against non-interference. Unno et al. [62] describe an
analysis which uses model checking of self-composed programs to find vio-
lations of non-interference. The authors also described optimisations to the
naive self-composition. Finding non-interference violations via their technique
is definitely the first step towards quantifying information leakage. I am also
grateful to Hiroshi Unno who provided me with the full source code of their
implementation.
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Conclusion
This thesis described the lattice of information and its properties as the under-
lying structure of quantitative information flow. Furthermore, we presented
three techniques to infer and check leakage in programs.
The first approach exhaustively enumerates all possible confidential values
in order to calculate the leakage. It is a precise method to calculate the leakage
of loops, implementing the theory of [38]. However, state explosion issues make
this approach unusable in practice.
In chapter 5, a static analysis translated the program to be analysed to a
bit-vector language which in turn gets solved by a SAT solver. This approach
splits the task of calculating the precise leakage into finding the number of
equivalence classes and then model counting their sizes. It is a more automated
analysis, however the scalability issues are not adequately addressed yet.
Finally, the last tool developed in the course of this thesis, describes a way
to check bounds on how much information leaked in programs. A property
is defined which, if a counterexample exists, implies a lower bound on the
channel capacity. Encoding the confidential space as nondeterministic pool
of values allows reasoning independent of the size of the secret. The tool has
been applied to describe bounds on existing leakage vulnerabilities in the Linux
Kernel and also verified that some patches reduce the leakage.
To further improve the quantitative analysis of information leakage one has
to find an appropriate notion of abstraction. It is a very big challenge however
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to find an abstraction appropriate for a quantitative analysis. Abstraction is
about reducing the number of details to make the analysis more tractable;
quantification, on the other hand, becomes more precise the more details there
are in the system. There is a tradeoff to be made between precision and
tractability.
Chapter 6 introduced two forms of abstraction. Firstly, it does not precisely
quantify the leakage anymore but solely defines a property whose violation
or verification implies bounds on the maximal possible leakage. Secondly,
it represents confidential values in an abstract way by defining them as a
nondeterministic source. This allows a program analysis tool to draw values
from this pool “on demand” until the property is violated or verified.
Further improving and understanding abstractions in the context of a quan-
titative analysis is definitely the right way to go for future research.
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